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PROCEDURAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ATTORNEY'S FEE
PROBLEM IN COMPLEX LITIGATION
Christopher P. Lu*
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice William Brennan once observed that disputes about at-
torneys' fees are "one of the least socially productive types of liti-
gation imaginable." 1 Socially productive or not, attorneys' fees are
a major problem in complex litigation2 today because of both the
time and resources needed to determine appropriate fees and the
public perception that fees are excessive. While the attorneys' fee
problem is not unique to complex suits, the problem is magnified
because: 1) complex suits are often more protracted than ordinary
suits and necessarily require more lawyers; 2) many fee shifting
statutes can be triggered in complex suits;3 and 3) class action
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert E. Cowen, United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. A.B., 1988, Princeton University; J.D., 1991, Harvard Law School. This arti-
cle was written for Professor Arthur R. Miller as part of the American Law Institute's Pro-
ject on Complex Litigation.
1. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 442 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also In re
Capital Underwriters, Inc. Sec. Litig., 519 F. Supp. 92, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd in part
and vacated in part, 705 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1983) ("a lawsuit is a fruit tree planted in a
lawyer's garden") (citations omitted); Christopher T. Lutz, Planning Fees Fights, Lrrio., at
44 (Fall 1986), ("Litigating about the costs and expenses incurred by plaintiffs' counsel is
one of the duller things a human being can do."). Attorney's fee litigation in civil rights suits
has been described as a "nest of Chinese boxes."
The outside box is the litigation of the civil rights issue itself. Within it is the litiga-
tion over the fees incurred in the litigation over the merits - ordinarily a lesser liti-
gation, as our metaphor implies .... Within the initial fee litigation will be another
litigation - usually a smaller one . . . - over the attorneys' fee incurred by the
plaintiff in the initial fee litigation. And so on without necessary end.
Muscare v. Quinn, 680 F.2d 42, 44 (7th Cir. 1982).
2. While there is no generally accepted definition of complex litigation, this paper will
follow the American Law Institute's interpretation and use the term to encompass "mul-
tiparty, multiform" litigation. Tim AMERIcAN LAW INsTITUTE PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COM-
PLEX LITIGATION 4 (1987) (footnote omitted). Such complex suits include: class or derivative
actions, mass tort suits, antitrust violations, and civil rights actions.
3. While there are at least 75 federal statutes related to fee shifting, several statutes espe-
cially relevant to complex litigation are: antitrust claims, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1991); civil rights,
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1991); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1991); consumer claims, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (1991); copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1991); patent, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1991). Attor-
neys can also recover fees incurred in creating a common fund, which is generally the case in
class action suits, particularly shareholder derivative suits. RicHARD L. MARcus & EDWARD
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suits, with their resulting common funds,4 form a large portion of
complex litigation.5 This paper will propose several procedural
mechanisms to make the determination of attorneys' fee more just
and efficient and examine the extent to which judges have adopted
these mechanisms.
There is no question that complex litigation, particularly large
class action suits, is a major burden on the judicial system.' Ac-
cording to a 1988 Harris survey, more than half of the federal
judges, corporate counsel, and public interest lawyers surveyed felt
that the cost of civil litigation is a "major problem" in this coun-
try. Whatever problems exist in civil litigation are only intensified
F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE
692-97 (1985); see also Symposium, Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 1
(1984); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Over-
view, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651.
4. [After a case is settled] then beg[ins] the process which all too often consumes a
disproportionate share of the court's time, the application for attorneys' fee. It is at
this point in these and other common fund cases that the court is abandoned by the
adversary system and left to the plaintiff's unilateral application and the judge's own
good conscience. Rarely do the settling defendants, who have created the pool of
money from which the attorneys' fee are awarded, offer any counterpoint; rarely do
members of the class come forward with any response or opposition to the fees
sought. There are no amici curiae who volunteer their advice.
For its guidance during this solitary inquiry, the court is confronted with [only] a
mountain of computerized billing records....
In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
5. Even when there are no novel issues involved, courts have awarded attorneys' fees in
cases of "massive multi-district litigation . . . with myriad attendant subsidiary issues."
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy II), 540
F.2d 102, 114 (3d Cir. 1976). "The Lindy litigation represented the largest number of cases
of any matter that has ever come before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation."
Barbara W. Thompson, Note, Attorneys' Fees in Class Action Shareholder Derivative
Suits, 9 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 671, 686 n.99 (1984).
6. At their peak in 1976, federal class actions represented only 2.7% of all civil suits filed
and 4.3% of all civil suits pending in the federal courts. As of 1984, class actions were only
.9% of all pending suits. Mary K. Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the
Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEx. L. REV. 385, 386 n.8 (1987). These statistics, however, may be
deceiving given the time-consuming nature of complex suits involving multiple litigants and
issues. See Carroll Seron, The Professional Project of Parajudges: The Case of U.S. Magis-
trates, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 557, 564 (1988) ("[T]here is little doubt that a major increase in
the 'mega' cases and their impact on the courts' operation has occurred.").
7. REPORT OF A TASK FORCE, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL Lm-
GATION 6 (1989) [hereinafter BROOKINGS REPORT]. At the suggestion of Senator Joseph Biden
(D.-Del.), a group of lawyers, judges and professors worked under the auspices of the Brook-
ings Institution and the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice to develop recommen-
dations for reforming the civil litigation process. Id. at vii. The group commissioned Louis
Harris and Associates to survey 1,000 federal judges and litigators on their opinions. Id. at 6.
The study's recommendations have formed the basis of the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990.
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when the number of parties, forums, or issues increases. In the
wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, for example, eighty-four law
firms filed ninety suits on behalf of 7,000 claimants." And the six-
year-old Dalkon Shield litigation has produced 200,000 claims na-
tionwide.' Not surprisingly the costs of waging these battles is
staggering. One need not look far to find outrageous examples of
attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs' attorneys in the Agent Orange suit
received more than $13 million in fees and expenses; the defend-
ants' attorneys received between $75 million and $100 million from
seven chemical companies. 10 Agent Orange, though one of the most
famous complex cases, was not the largest award of attorneys' fees.
In the Fine Paper litigation, lawyers claimed $21 million or forty
percent of the $50 million class award, despite the fact that many
of the legal tasks were duplicated or triplicated." Even more as-
tounding was the fact that there were more attorneys than parties
involved in Fine Paper, and at least one-third of the firms did not
intervene until after the defendant had settled the case.. 2 In one
instance, plaintiffs' attorneys billed 1475 hours for preparing and
taking one third-party deposition, which the court observed was
"the equivalent of three attorneys each spending two and one-half
months doing nothing else except preparing for and taking this
deposition."' 3 The Corrugated Container Antitrust litigation 4
eventually led to attorneys' fees of more than $40 million out of a
$550 million settlement.' 5
8. Loren Berger, Cleaning Up After Exxon, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 5, 1990, at 1, 14.
9. Howard Mintz, Trust Fund at $2.4 Billion: Dalkon Shield Injury Claims Start Anew
in Court, LEGAL TaEs, July 30, 1990, at 6.
10. Stephen Labaton, Five Years After Settlement, Agent Orange War Lives On, N.Y.
imEs, May 8, 1989, at D1, D2. As of mid-1989, five years after the case had settled, the
total settlement had reached $250 million, but only $3 million had been paid to the veterans
and their families. Id. at D1. A comparable fee award was approved by a special master in
an employment discrimination suit against AT&T Technologies. Rorie Sherman, Million-
Dollar Fees Approved in AT&T Suit, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 11, 1991, at 2. Lawyers in the case
will receive $9.9 million in fees out of a fund of $66-$175 million. Id.
11. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 75-77 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984).
12. Id. at 68, 74.
13. Id. at 173 (footnote omitted).
14. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1985).
15. Norman J. Wiener, Simple Lessons from a Complex Case, LMIG., Spring 1986 at 14.
The case involved 200,000 class members, 39 pretrial hearings, 205 pretrial orders, and 15
appeals. Id. Another massive case was Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy H), 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (374 cases and over 10,000
claims filed). Thompson, supra note 5, at 686 n.99.
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But whether or not fees are actually abused," the system needs
to be reformed if only to enhance the appearance of fairness to the
class and lessen the burdens on an already strained judicial sys-
tem.1 7 One observer of the Agent Orange settlement commented:
"The disparity between the costs of processing this case and the
return to the plaintiffs is unusually stark. There is no question
that the major beneficiaries in this case have been the litigators
rather than their clients, a phenomenon by no means unique to
this case. '" Therefore, the difficulty is ensuring that attorneys do
not automatically receive the fees they request, while preventing
"a request for attorneys' fee [from] result[ing] in a second major
litigation." 19
Though some legal scholars have suggested that the answer lies
primarily in changing the conduct of attorneys,2" this paper is pre-
mised on the assumption that attorneys are unable, and indeed un-
willing, to police themselves under the present complex litigation
scheme. Only greater innovation by the courts can be effective.
But innovation can also mean more work for the courts, as evi-
denced by the demands of "managerial judging." Professor Mary
16. In a survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, judges were far more likely
than attorneys to agree with the statement: "Fee abuses are a serious problem in contempo-
rary litigation." Arthur R. Miller, Attorneys' Fee in Class Actions 306 (Fed. Judicial Ctr.
Annual Report 1980) [hereinafter FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT]. But the statistics are
still striking: 63% of judges felt lawyers "often worked more hours than necessary" and 29%
felt unnecessary work "sometimes" happened. Id. at 267. Seventy-three percent of plaintiff's
counsel conceded unnecessary work "sometimes" occurred, while 17% felt such abuse hap-
pened "often." Id. at 268.
17. "The judges, it is said, have been converted into accountants and watchdogs, the
courts are burdened with extensive litigation on fee issues, and the litigants are taxed with
the time and money costs of waging such fee fights." Id. at 338.
18. Labaton, supra note 10, at D1 (quoting Professor Peter H. Schuck).
19. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
20. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 6, at 409 ("The solution must rest predominantly with
class counsel: Courts cannot achieve change unless the attorneys recognize their special re-
sponsibilities and desire change."). While Professor Kane believes the answer lies in the
class counsel, she also describes the inability of lawyers to coordinate and economize their
preparation of complex suits and recognizes the need for greater judicial supervision. Id. at
402-09; cf. Mary Kay Kane, The Lawyer as Litigator in the 1980s, 14 N. Ky. L. REV. 311
(1988) (indicating that the reluctance of lawyers to make civil litigation more affordable has
forced courts to take the initiative to force change).
21. "[T]here is a consensus that some litigation costs are not demanded by the merits of
the case, but rather are incurred as a direct outgrowth of the incentives that have been built
into the private legal industry itself." BROOKINGs REPORT, supra note 7, at 35. For a discus-
sion of how the entrepreneurial inclinations of class action lawyers are in conflict with the
interests of their clients, see Charles W. Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee
Shifting, and the Limits of Professional Discipline, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984,
at 293.
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Kay Kane noted: "Judges have been schooled to remain indepen-
dent and aloof, and they are extremely busy, indeed, overworked.
Thus, it may be unrealistic to expect the courts to welcome yet
another responsibility to their already overcrowded schedules. 22
Any procedural reform, therefore, must necessarily rely on "nonju-
dicial" devices to avoid additional burdens on the court system.
Yet until recently, judges have been reluctant to use such mecha-
nisms. Most of the attention to reforming complex litigation has
occurred in other areas; for example, attempting to make Rule 23
(class actions) more amenable to mass tort litigation.23 In short,
judges spend too much time worrying about what kinds of cases
should be consolidated and how they should be settled, instead of
focusing on what happens afterwards when lawyers try to collect
their fees. 2
4
This paper examines the feasibility and desirability of several
reforms: appointing magistrates and special masters to oversee the
fee process; naming guardians to protect class interests; encourag-
ing judges to use pretrial conferences to set ground rules for attor-
neys' fees; appointing lead counsel or lead committees to organize
the litigation; requiring attorneys to submit contemporaneous time
records; and awarding interim fee awards. 25 In examining the rela-
tive advantages of these reforms, this paper surveys the state of
attorneys' fees in complex litigation since the Federal Judicial
Center and Third Circuit Reports. 26 As Judge Jack Weinstein's
highly publicized handling of the Agent Orange case27 demon-
22. Kane, supra note 6, at 406.
23. Bruce H. Nielson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?: Suggested Revisions of
Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 461 (1988).
24. See Kane, supra note 6, at 403 ('The notion that the court must protect the interests
of the absent class members should be constant throughout the litigation, not just for
settlements.").
25. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.54 (1985) ("Other special resources, such
as referral to a private or governmental technical body, use of an advisory jury of experts in
a non-jury case, or consultation with a confidential 'adviser' to the court, may be considered
in complex litigation.") [hereinafter MANUAL]. An additional innovation which is not dis-
cussed is the use of computers. See Palmer Brown Madden, Information Management in
Complex Litigation, LTIG., Spring 1978, at 12.
26. The Federal Judicial Center Report was published in 1980, and the Third Circuit
Report in 1985. See Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237 (3d Cir. 1985) [hereinaf-
ter Third Circuit Report].
27. One of the catalysts of the "managerial judging" movement, Weinstein hired extra law
clerks and paralegals, assigned a federal magistrate, appointed six special masters (four or
five working simultaneously), and authorized the use of paid consultants. PETER H. SCHUcK,
AGENT ORANGE ON TRnAL 5 (2d ed. 1987).
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strates, the resources for these procedural innovations are available
in the federal system2 s where most complex litigation occurs. 29 Fi-
nally, this paper hypothesizes that any judicial expense is more
than offset by overall savings of time and money.
Improving the procedures by which courts decide attorneys' fees
will have many positive effects. First, by checking potential abuses
by attorneys, the interests of the plaintiffs are better protected.
This is particularly important in class action suits, where the attor-
neys are largely autonomous and unaccountable. One of the pecu-
liar traits of the attorneys' fee issue is that it is the one time in the
litigation process when the attorney is at clear odds with the client,
since the amount the client, or class, ultimately receives will vary
according to the size of the attorneys' fee award. 0 It is at this
point that the adversarial system fails, since the faceless members
of the class have little ability or knowledge with which to challenge
the award. Consequently, only the court with its limited time and
resources is left to safeguard the class's interests.
Second, greater predictability and order will be brought to the
entire fee process. Not only are attorneys put on notice as to what
procedural requirements they must follow, but they will be more
certain of the amount of their final fee award. Additionally, one of
the barriers to consolidation of multidistrict litigation is attorney
uncertainty over the fee issue; these reforms could decrease this
resistance.
Third, and most importantly, reforms can improve the image of
a judicial system suffering from press accounts of seemingly incom-
prehensible fee awards. The perception that complex litigation ex-
28. "Federal district judges who can draw upon masters, magistrates, law clerks, and
other resources may make ready use of these tools. The greatest difficulty probably will be
that these techniques also must be used by solitary rural state judges with large dockets and
little support." Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multi-
state Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 67 (1986).
29. But see Mintz, supra note 9, at 6 (stating that most Dalkon Shield cases are presently
in a unique settlement procedure, awaiting trial or arbitration if the offer of settlement is
inadequate).
30. The resulting problem of attorneys' fee being considered in settlement negotiations
was addressed by the Supreme Court in Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), reh'g denied,
476 U.S. 1179 (1986), in which the Court allowed such negotiations; see also Kane, supra
note 6, at 397 (stating that the number of cases combining a low settlement with high attor-
neys' fees is small). For a recent analysis of the relationship between attorney and client in
the class action setting, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attor-
ney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommen-
dations for Reform, 58 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1991).
[Vol. 26:41
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ists solely for the attorneys and not for the clients is reinforced by
the recent problems in the Johns-Manville asbestos trust fund1.3 It
is estimated that legal fees have accounted for thirty to forty per-
cent - or between $218 million and $374 million - of the money
expended by the trust.3 2 Partly as a result of the attorneys' fees,
the trust ran out of money, forcing Judge Weinstein to restructure
the fund and cap the attorneys' fees at twenty percent.3
Though many particularly skillful judges are, and will continue
to be, successful in controlling the fees process without these re-
forms,34 even these exceptional judges will find such procedural
mechanisms useful in freeing up their increasingly limited time for
other matters. However, one alternative which this paper does not
advocate is awarding fees based on a simple percentage of the com-
mon fund.3 5 Proponents of this alternative argue that after sub-
stantial time and resources are spent calculating a lodestar,36 the
final figure inevitably ends up in the twenty-five percent to thirty-
31. See, Andrew Blum, A Routine Hearing Quickly Turns Less So, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 24,
1990, at 8; William Gifford, Problem for Manville Trust: Torts Mount, Cash Dwindles, LE-
GAL Tias, July 30, 1990, at 1; Rita H. Jensen, Even the Deserts are Wet; Judge Turns Up
Heat on Asbestos, NAT'L L.J., July 23, 1990, at 1.
32. Sharon Walsh, Asbestos Cases at Another Crossroads, WASH. POST, July 15, 1990, at
Hi. Leon Silverman, the court-appointed representative of future asbestos claimants, was
awarded $5 million - "double the fees he billed" - for establishing the trust. Id. at H6. An
even higher estimate is that two-thirds of available funds for asbestos victims goes to law-
yers' fees and court costs. Stephen Labaton, Asbestos Cases Pose Test for a Court Ringmas-
ter, N.Y. Tims, Aug. 16, 1991, at B16.
33. Wade Lambert & Amy D. Marcus, Attorneys' Fees Capped in Asbestos Case, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 22, 1990, at B5.
34. See In re Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. Sec. Litig., 643 F. Supp. 148, 152 (S.D. Ohio
1986) ("We wish to send a message ... to the effect that the Court, in the discharge of its
duty, no matter how tempting from a docket-management perspective, cannot rubber stamp
attorneys' fee applications.").
35. At least three circuits (the Seventh, Ninth and D.C.) have recently expressed approval
for a percentage fee system in common fund cases. See Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v.
Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989); Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250
(7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989); Bebchick v. Washington Metro Area
Transit Comm'n, 805 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding
the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of
Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 724 (1986) ("The per-
centage of the recovery fee award formula is such a 'deregulatory' reform because it relies on
incentives rather than costly monitoring."). The Third Circuit report also recommended a
percentage approach because it would increase uniformity and predictability. Third Circuit
Report, supra note 26, at 246-55.
36. The lodestar is the "number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by prevailing
hourly rate in community for similar work and is then adjusted to reflect other factors such
as contingent nature of suit and quality of representation." BLACK'S LAW DicToNARY 941
(6th ed. 1990).
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three percent range.3 7 Opponents argue, however, that there is no
general rule about what is a reasonable percentage.3 s Judge
Marilyn Patel, who favors a percentage approach, noted in the Ac-
tivision case:
The question this court is compelled to ask is, "Is this process neces-
sary?" Under a cost-benefit analysis, the answer would be a re-
sounding, "No!" Not only do the Lindy and Kerr-Johnson analyses
consume an undue amount of court time with little resulting advan-
tage to anyone, but, in fact, it may be to the detriment of the class
members. They are forced to wait until the court has done a thor-
ough, conscientious analysis of the attorneys' fee petition. Or, class
members may suffer a further diminution of their fund when a spe-
cial master is retained and paid from the fund. 9
Patel concluded: "[A lodestar approach] does not achieve the
stated purposes of proportionality, predictability and protection of
the class. . . .It adds to the work load of already overworked dis-
trict courts. In short, it does not encourage efficiency, but rather, it
adds inefficiency to the process."4
Judge Patel's generalizations do not fairly characterize the pro-
cedural reforms advocated in this paper. Pretrial orders, the ap-
pointment of lead counsel, and contemporaneous time records
37. For a detailed look at this phenomenon, see In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp.
1373, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1989) ("What is curious is that whatever method is used and no mat-
ter what billing records are submitted... the result is an award that almost always hovers
around 30% of the fund created by the settlement."). But other courts have found a broader
range of percentages. See Weseley v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 711 F. Supp. 713, 718
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("In this circuit, fees typically range from 15% to 30% of the recovery.");
In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 749-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating
a range of 20% to 50%), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
38. In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation Program Litig., 736 F. Supp. 1007,
1016 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
39. In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 1375.
40. Id. at 1378; see Cosgrove v. Sullivan, 759 F. Supp. 166, 168 (S.D. N.Y. 1991) ("While
the advantages to a lodestar approach are readily apparent, its defect has been gradually
revealed and it is today an anathema in many circles.") A variation of the percentage ap-
proach is being used by Judge Vaughn Walker in the Oracle Securities class action case.
Judge Walker, who is critical of the lodestar approach, has ordered lawyers to submit sealed
bids to handle the case on a percentage basis. John E. Morris, Judge Injects Lawyer Com-
petition Into Dispute, LEGAL Tiais, Aug. 20, 1990, at 10, 11. One of the plaintiff's lawyers,
Michael Malakof, argues that "[a] firm that bids too low might be tempted to settle a case
too quickly, for fear of running up costs its fees would not cover. I have problems saying the
lowest price is best for the class." Id. at 11. See In re Bracle Securities Litigation, 132
F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (awarding lead counsel task to one of bidders); In re Oracle
Securities Litigation, 131 F.R.D. 688 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (establishing bid process).
[Vol. 26:41
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neither prolong the litigation nor diminish the settlement fund.
Though appointing magistrates, masters, and guardians can be
costly, both in terms of time and money, such extrajudicial officers
free up time for judges. Most importantly, these officers safeguard
the interests of the client, a benefit for which there is no price.
A percentage approach, though attractive in its simplicity, is po-
tentially more unfair to both the plaintiffs and the attorneys.41
Percentage calculations could provide enormous windfalls to law-
yers,42 while encouraging frivolous litigation. In the Exxon Valdez
case, Jerry Cohen, one of the lead counsels, said, "Obviously, if we
get $10 billion, we're not going to petition the court for 20 percent.
The court would just throw us out. Those judges up there are not
going to let any lawyers walk away with a fortune. ' 43 In the asbes-
tos cases, it is unfathomable to many observers why lawyers con-
tinue to be paid on a contingency basis since the processing of as-
bestos claims has become relatively simple.44 As one attorney close
to the cases remarked, "It's clear that there's too much money go-
ing to the attorneys. There's not much controversy about
that. . . . There's no question about the liability of [Johns-
Manville]. Paralegals do all the paperwork. Why should the law-
yers get all the money?"45 A percentage approach is also unwork-
able in cases where no fund is created, as when injunctive relief is
granted. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never expressly ap-
proved percentage formulas in fee-shifting cases since "a reasona-
ble fee ... reflects the amount of attorney time reasonably ex-
pended in litigation.""'
41. For examples of when courts have considered and rejected a percentage approach, see
Rothfarb v. Hambrecht, 649 F. Supp. 183, 238 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Cf. Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984); Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 258 (the Lindy method is a
"cumbersome, enervating, and often surrealistic process of preparing and evaluating fee pe-
titions that now plagues the Bench and Bar.").
42. The Manual for Complex Litigation states, "An award of attorneys' fees should fairly
compensate the attorney for the reasonable value of the services rendered, based on the
circumstances of the particular case." MANUAL, supra note 25, at § 24.12 (emphasis added);
see City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (rejecting an argument that fees must be
proportionate to the size of damage award).
43. Berger, supra note 8, at 14.
44. Walsh, supra note 32, at H1.
45. Id. at H6. One of the plaintiff's attorneys noted, "Most of the lawyers who got fees on
the first round of settlements earned their money ... It took them 10 years and they
worked their fannies off to bring Manville to heel. But once the [trust] was in operation, a
lawyer who only had to file a piece of paper to get money should not get the same amount."
Id.
46. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 900 n.16 (1984).
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With attorneys seemingly unable to regulate themselves, proce-
dural, rather than substantive, reform is the answer. But current
procedural protections, such as Rule 23(d) and (e), are inade-
quate.47 Any procedural change, however, must preserve the tradi-
tionally neutral role of the judge. As Professor Arthur Miller com-
mented, "[s]ome of these cases obligate federal judges to
undertake supervisory tasks requiring enormous expenditures of
time and effort, converting their role from one of passive adjudica-
tor of a dispute staged by opposing counsel to that of active sys-
tems manager. '48 The many competing interests involved in attor-
neys' fees require a new way of looking at complex litigation.
Reformers of the system, however, should proceed with caution.
[P]rocedures are rarely value-neutral, whether or not we believe that
they should be. Any procedure - regardless of the nature of the
underlying dispute or the method by which procedures are applied
- will affect the outcome of a case.
Since any procedural change affects the outcome of a lawsuit, the
question is whether the potential benefits from a change to non-
traditional procedures will outweigh the potential losses. Of course,
this calculation cannot be made with mathematical purity.49
47. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1169 (5th Cir. 1978)
("[T]he law accords special protections, primarily procedural in nature, to individual class
members whose interests may be compromised in the settlement process."), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1115 (1979); cf. Sylvia R. Lazos, Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements:
The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REV. 308,
324 n.91 (1985) ("Courts' reliance on notice as a prophylactic device is based on the assump-
tions that notice will reach and be read by the majority of class members and that notice
will motivate some class member(s) to intervene in the action. These assumptions are prob-
ably faulty.").
48. Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and
the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARv. L. REv. 664, 667 (1979) (footnote omitted); see
Monroe Freedman, Judges Chasing Lawyers: Dangerous Sport, LEGAL TiMs, Aug. 20, 1990,
at 16 (quoting Arthur Miller, "Strong judicial management is a potential threat to the ad-
versary system as it has existed for hundreds of years because it calls for a significant
change in the power relationship between judges and lawyers and in their respective func-
tions."). An example of an "active systems manager" is Judge Charles R. Weiner of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, who is overseeing more than 26,000 asbestos cases.
Labaton, supra note 32, at B16.
49. Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litiga-
tion, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 440, 450-51 (1986) (footnote omitted).
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II. MAGISTRATES AND SPECIAL MASTERS
Magistrates and masters can be invaluable resources in fee dis-
putes by acting as fact finders and interim adjudicators. In an era
of fiscal constraints and increasing caseloads, magistrates and mas-
ters are cost-efficient alternatives: "Cost realities and caseload
pressures have created structural constraints that push toward the
use of various alternatives to the labor intensive, formal, and dis-
crete practices of the traditional adjudicatory model with judges at
the organizational helm. '50 A variety of functions, too time-con-
suming to assign to a judge, can be assigned to these extrajudicial
officers: reviewing timesheets for excessive or duplicative hours;
presiding over periodic hearings on fee disputes; monitoring the as-
signment of work among the attorneys; and recommending a final
fee award to the judge.5 ' The magistrate or master should be ap-
pointed as soon as possible to ensure constant supervision of the
attorneys. Depending on the complexity of the litigation, these of-
ficers can be assigned other case responsibilities, such as supervis-
ing discovery.
The role of the federal magistrate is entrenched firmly in the
judicial system. The statutory definition of the office is given in the
Federal Magistrates Act.52 By the early 1980s, the number of fed-
eral magistrates equaled the number of Article III judges.5 3 Addi-
tionally, there are no constitutional problems in assigning the at-
torney fee function to magistrates.5 4 The powers of magistrates are
overturned only when they overstep the district judge's role as
"the ultimate decisionmaker. ''55 Attorneys' fees do not pose such
50. Seron, supra note 6, at 564.
51. Periodic review of billing during the course of the litigation was suggested by respon-
dents to a 1984 study conducted for the Federal Judicial Center. Thomas E. Willging, Judi-
cial Regulation of Attorneys' Fees: Beginning the Process at Pretrial 9 (Fed. Judicial Ctr.
Annual Report 1984).
52. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1991). Section 636(b)(1) allows magistrates to be assigned either
dispositive or nondispositive pretrial motions. Motions for attorneys' fees seem to fit under
the nondispositive motion category because such motions have no effect on the outcome of
the case. Generally, fees are not decided until after the case is over.
53. MARcus & SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 627.
54. See Matthews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976) (upholding local rule allowing magis-
trates to conduct some factual hearings).
55. Ford v. Estelle, 740 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Wimmer v. Cook, 774 F.2d
68 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that a magistrate cannot conduct jury trial referred to under §
636(b)(1)(B) because de novo review not possible). The 1990 amendments, however, are in-
tended to promote greater use of magistrates to preside over civil cases. Recent Federal
Court Legislation Made Some Noteworthy Changes, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 31, 1990, at 20.
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problems since: 1) fees are only tangential to the ultimate resolu-
tion of the case; and 2) any decision on fees still must be approved
by the district judge. Assigning the attorneys' fee issue to magis-
trates is no different from assigning them responsibility over dis-
covery or giving them relative autonomy over the social security
and prisoner docket, as is the practice in many districts.56
Judges also have the authority to appoint special masters under
Rule 53. Typically, a special master will be "a private attorney, a
retired judge, or a law professor to whom a federal court delegates
front line judicial responsibility . . . for specified, discrete tasks. '58
While theoretically any court task can be assigned to masters,
judges usually appoint masters to oversee discovery or enforce
court decrees.59 In some extraordinary cases, like the asbestos liti-
gation, masters have been appointed to help settle the cases.60
Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil argues that masters actually may
be superior to judges and magistrates in their expertise, thus gar-
nering more respect from the attorneys.6 1 With masters, the argu-
ment goes, lawyers are less likely to attempt "tactical ploys or take
56. See, e.g., Sargent v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 739 F. Supp. 1067 (D.S.C.
1990); Hargrave v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 738 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(both cases having magistrates make recommendations on attorneys' fees in social security
cases originally assigned to them). See generally Seron, supra note 6, at 561 ("[M]agistrates
may also be encouraged, however, to develop an expertise in settlement techniques or post-
trial negotiation over attorney fees.") (footnote omitted).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 53. Though Rule 53(b) states that "[a] reference to a master shall be
the exception and not the rule," Rule 53(d)(3) specifically authorizes use of masters "[w]hen
matters of accounting are in issue." Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1991) also allows the judge
to designate a magistrate as a special master.
58. Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in the Pretrial Development of Big Cases: Poten-
tial and Problems, 1982 Am. B. FOUND. RES. J. 287, 294 [hereinafter Brazil (1982)]. See gen-
erally Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or
Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. Cm. L. Rav. 394 (1986); Geoffrey C. Hazard & Paul R. Rice,
Judicial Management of the Pretrial Process in Massive Litigation: Special Masters as
Case Managers, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 375.
59. See, e.g., United States v. City & County of San Francisco, 696 F. Supp. 1287 (N.D.
Cal. 1988) (appointing a master to monitor fire department's compliance with anti-discrimi-
nation order); E.E.O.C. v. Burlington N., Inc., 1985 WL 7959 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (appointing a
master to hear objections of plaintiffs to consent decree).
60. Kenneth Feinberg, the special master in the Agent Orange litigation, was appointed
by Judge Weinstein to help settle 500 Brooklyn Navy Yard asbestos claims. Gifford, supra
note 31, at 19. Mr. Feinberg is a partner at Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays and Handler.
Similarly, Boston University Law School Professor Eric Green was appointed by Judge Rya
Zobel to help resolve the 2,100 active asbestos cases in Boston. ASBESTOS LrrG. REP., Dec.
15, 1989.
61. Brazil (1982), supra note 58, at 295; see also Seron, supra note 6, at 560 (stating that
a federal magistrate in Oregon received the highest rating by lawyers of any judicial officer
in the state).
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disingenuous positions" as they would with removed or unsophisti-
cated judges.6 2
Many litigators we interviewed believe that big case discovery
needs a firm, sophisticated and neutral managerial presence . ..
[Also required is] thorough knowledge not only of factual and legal
contentions but also of the personalities, behavior patterns, and real
world situations of the principal actors in the litigation drama. That
kind of knowledge can be developed and maintained during the dis-
covery stage of a large lawsuit only through a close and continuous
attention the courts seem unable to provide.6
The same qualities necessary to manage discovery are also neces-
sary to monitor attorneys' fees. Respect for a master can be in-
creased further by allowing the attorneys to play some role in the
selection of the master. In appointing the master, the court should
be clear in detailing the master's powers, responsibilities, and final-
ity of decisions, thus decreasing any uncertainty of the master's
authority. 4
The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 53 also states that mas-
ters may be a superior alternative to magistrates "when some spe-
cial expertise is desired or when a magistrate is unavailable for
lengthy and detailed supervision of a case. '6 5 In turning to a
master for help, Judge Harold Greene stated in Trout v. Ball:"e
The dockets of the U.S. Magistrates in this Courthouse are already
seriously overcrowded. A reference of this case to a Magistrate
would mean delaying action on the individtial relief portion of this
case, once again, for months or even years . .. [A] special master
[will be] able to devote substantial amounts of time to hearing and
disposing of the many individual claims.6 7
62. Brazil (1982), supra note 58, at 304. Masters are also more flexible in meeting counsel,
can resolve disputes faster, better monitor potential problems, and are more accessible. Id.
at 310-12.
63. Id. at 302-03; see also Seron, supra note 6, at 560 ("Open-ended interviews with law-
yers in these districts disclosed that they felt equally comfortable arguing a case before a
judge or a magistrate.").
64. See Young v. Pierce, 640 F. Supp. 1476, 1477-78 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (setting out a
lengthy pretrial order on the role of the master in the litigation).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (advisory committee's note).
66. 705 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1989).
67. Id. at 707.
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The advantage of a magistrate over a master, of course, is his per-
manent relationship to the district court. Judges may be more con-
fident of a magistrate's work and more willing to accept his recom-
mendations. It is easy to imagine, however, a group of "permanent
masters" who the court would turn to for help in overseeing attor-
neys' fee.
The Manual for Complex Litigation explicitly recognizes the use
of quasi-judicial officers to decide fee issues: "If fee requests are
extensive or vigorously contested, the court should consider ap-
pointing an expert under Fed. R. Evid. 706 or referring the appli-
cations to one or more special masters appointed under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 532' '68 The 1983 amendments to Rule 16 also removed the
limits on what type of issues are referable to masters and magis-
trates.6 9 The old Rule 16 only allowed referral to a master in mak-
ing "findings to be used as evidence" in a case before a jury.70
While no reliable statistics are available, magistrates probably
are used more often than special masters in fee disputes. The re-
ports and recommendations of magistrates are also more likely to
be published in case reporters and included in on-line data bases,
such as WESTLAW or LEXIS.7 1 In Tarver v. City of Houston,
Magistrate Platter's report reads substantially like a judge's order
in its forcefulness and tone of finality, using such language as "the
Court makes the following award" and "[t]he City shall pay these
amounts to the various counsel for plaintiffs within seven calendar
days after the entry of this Order. '7 2 There is no hint that the
magistrate's order must be approved first by the judge; in fact, the
report does not even mention to which judge the case was
assigned. 3
68. MANUAL, supra note 25, § 24.13 (p. 187). This is contrary to the general rule against
use of such officers in deciding substantive issues in complex litigation. See id. § 21.52 (mas-
ters); § 21.53 (magistrates).
69. FED. R. CIv. P. 16 (advisory committee's note).
70. Id.
71. See e.g. Choudhury v. Blackie's House of Beef, Inc., No. 86-1247, 1988 WL 21703
(D.D.C. Feb. 29, 1988), Tarver v. City of Houston, 45 Empl.-Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 37,662 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 8, 1987); Alvarado v. Curry, No. 86 C 3555, 1987 WL 19813 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 1987)
(all involving fee recommendations by magistrates). Two recent opinions by a special master
are: Kronfeld v. Transworld Airlines, 129 F.R.D. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), and Rothfarb v. Ham-
brecht, 649 F. Supp. 183, 184-236 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Both the settlement and the fee award
in an employment discrimination suit brought by 13,000 female AT&T employees were ap-
proved by a special master, former Chief Judge Frank J. McGarr of the U.S. District Court
of Illinois. Labaton, supra note 10, at 2.
72. Tarver v. City of Houston, 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 37,662 (emphasis added).
73. On the other hand, in both Alvarado and Choudhury, the magistrates simply recom-
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The broad authority given to Magistrate Platter to enter a final
award on the issue of attorneys' fees in Tarver would be unusual if
the issue were instead assigned to a master. Magistrates, after all,
are more similar to Article III judges than masters (serving eight-
year terms with the possibility of reappointment) and generally are
considered integral parts of the judicial system. In fact, under 28
U.S.C. § 636(c), an entire case can be assigned to a magistrate by
consent of the parties.
In Kronfeld v. Transworld Airlines, 4 however, Judge Kimba
Wood gave her special master, Laura Bartell, a partner at
Shearman & Sterling, an extraordinary degree of responsibility in
deciding the attorneys' fees issue. In this case Bartell not only de-
termined the hours worked by the attorneys, their billable rates,
and expenses, but also added a multiplier of 1.25 based on risk,
disallowed certain undocumented expenses, 7 and invalidated a
fee-sharing agreement because it bore no relation to the services
performed, or the responsibility assumed by each law firm and
thus violated Disciplinary Rule 2-107(A). 71 The special master also
presided over a hearing in which counsel were given the opportu-
nity to challenge her draft report on fees before she submitted it to
the court. Wood called Bartell's detailed report, which covered
twenty-three pages in the Federal Rules Decision, "thorough, well-
documented and well-reasoned" and adopted the report in its
entirety.7
One of the few cases in which a judge explicitly has justified his
appointment of a special master was Rothfarb v. Hambrecht.78
Judge William Orrick recognized that "[tjhe hundreds of pages of
documentation submitted by counsel for the plaintiff class must be
carefully screened to assure that the hours claimed are not duplica-
tive, wasteful, or excessive. '79 Realizing, however, that his inability
to conduct such a "thorough evaluation" would conflict with his
mended proposed awards to the respective judges. Choudhury, No. 86-1247, 1988 WL 21703;
Alvarado, No. 86 C 3555, 1987 WL 19813.
74. 129 F.R.D. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
75. Bartell was able to provide long lists of "dates upon which [the] Pomerantz Levy
[firm] indicates contact with [attorney] Greenfield for which Greenfield has no similar en-
try" and "dates upon which Greenfield has contact with Pomerantz Levy for which Pomer-
antz Levy has no similar entry." Id. at 613-17.
76. Id. at 613.
77. Id. at 599.
78. 641 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
79. Id. at 74. Judge Orrick also may have been troubled by the fact that attorneys re-
quested $4 million in fees and expenses from the $11.4 million settlement, which was de-
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"duty to protect the absent class members," Orrick appointed a
special master to review the fee applications, and then report back
to the court, "with appropriate objections and
recommendations." 80
The master, James Thacher, prepared an extraordinarily de-
tailed report which covered fifty-three printed pages in the Federal
Supplement.81 Like the broad authority exercised by the master in
Kronfeld, Thacher disallowed fees for both inadequately docu-
mented hours and unsuccessful claims and appeals which did not
benefit the class. A multiplier of 1.5 was also recommended by
Thacher. Especially impressive was a thirty-seven-page "computer
breakdown of all the billings to determine the percentage of total
litigation time spent by each attorney and the percentage of total
litigation dedicated to each different category or phase of the
case."8 2 Judge Orrick described the final report as "an invaluable
tool in arriving at a final lodestar and reasonable fee award" and
approved Thacher's report almost in its entirety.8 2
In contrast to Kronfeld and Rothfarb, a much different posture
was adopted by Judge Barbara Rothstein in Naye v. Boyd. 3 Judge
Richard Bilby was appointed as special master but was given little
latitude to determine the attorneys' fees. 4 Despite Bilby's status
as an Article III judge (at the time, he was the Chief Judge of the
District of Arizona), 5 Rothstein was far from deferential in her re-
view of the master's report:
[I]t was never this court's intent to relinquish its discretion to re-
view Judge Bilby's recommendations and to determine the proper
award of attorneys' fee based on its own experience with the case.
This court managed the progress of this case as well as the related
cases of Bradshaw v. Jenkins and Seafirst v. Jenkins for more than
four years, including motions practice, discovery and trial prepara-
tion. Although it is very appreciative of the services rendered by the
Special Master in connection with the attorney's fee request, this
rived from multipliers of 2.37 to 2.74. The requested fees represented an hourly rate of over
$400. Id. at 72.
80. 641 F. Supp. at 74.
81. Rothfarb v. Hambrecht, 649 F. Supp. 183, 184-236 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
82. Id. at 236-37.
82. Id. at 237.
83. No. C83-771R, 1988 WL 75236 (W.D. Wash., Jan. 20, 1988).
84. The class counsel had suggested appointing Bilby, since Bilby had been involved in
the settlement of the case.
85. Naye, No. C83-771R, 1988 WL 75236, at *1.
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court will not hesitate, where necessary, to substitute its own judg-
ment in light of its more extensive knowledge of the case.88
Consequently, Rothstein disallowed Bilby's percentage formula
for determining fees and essentially redecided every minutiae of
the fee issue, including the billable rates of each attorney. It is un-
clear whether Bilby's work was simply subpar or whether Roth-
stein's defensive posture was an example of judicial reluctance to
rely on outside actors. As to the former, Rothstein complimented
Bilby for "render[ing] an invaluable service." The latter explana-
tion loses some of its credibility since Bilby was a sitting judge and
was familiar with the case (he had helped in the settlement).
Similarly, in Martin v. University of South Alabama,87 the dis-
trict court rejected the special master's findings of hourly rates and
multipliers in a sex discrimination case, only to have the order re-
versed. The Eleventh Circuit noted that "the findings of fact made
by a Special Master must be accepted by the district court unless
clearly erroneous. ' 'e
For whatever reason, judges are reluctant to appoint magistrates
and masters to decide fee matters. The Federal Judicial Center
study found that 72.3% of judges (forty-seven of sixty-five) have
never used a magistrate or master to help determine attorneys' fee,
and only 21.5% sometimes used them.8 9 Usually, these extrajudi-
cial officers were used to decide attorneys' fees when the master or
magistrate already had another role in the litigation, for instance,
supervising discovery.90 Perhaps one of the explanations for judi-
86. 911 F.2d 604 (11th Cir. 1990).
87. Id. at 608.
88. Id.
89. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 16, at 226. Admittedly, this survey is
probably outdated. For recent examples of courts using magistrates to decide attorneys' fee,
see Cutting v. Town of Allenstown, 936 F.2d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 1991) (§ 1983 action); Willis v.
Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 394 (6th Cir. 1991) (social security claim); Walt Disney Co. v. Best,
No. 88 Civ. 1595 (swk), 1990 WL 144209 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1990) (copyright infringement);
Royal Exch. Assurance Co. v. M/V Gulf Fleet No. 54, Civ. No. 86-1367, 1990 WL 124291
(E.D. La. Aug. 9, 1990) (indemnification of attorney's fee); Albrecht v. Stranczek, No. 87C
9535 1990 WL 114610 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 1990) (Rule 11 sanctions); Farone v. Sciarretta, 131
F.R.D. 29 (1990) (§ 1988 fees).
90. The FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT gives examples of other functions in which
these officers have been involved: Senter v. General Motors Corp, 383 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.
Ohio 1974), afi'd, 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976) (back pay in
discrimination); Antibiotic Antitrust Cases, 410 F. Supp. 680 (D. Minn. 1975) (settlement);
Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 8,583 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (back
pay). FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 16, at 261. For a more recent example
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cial reluctance was given by Judge Seitz in Lindy I when he stated:
"[a] judge is presumed knowledgeable as to the fees charged by
attorneys in general and as to the quality of legal work presented
to him by particular attorneys; these presumptions obviate the
need for expert testimony such as might establish the value of ser-
vices rendered by doctors or engineers." 91
A second explanation is the perception that using extrajudicial
officers will prolong the litigation. In the Activision case, Judge
Patel used a special master to analyze "the attorney billing
records, declarations, and documentation. 9 2 Despite praising the
special master for having "done a skillful job of thoroughly analyz-
ing" the materials, Patel noted that in the future she would use a
simple percentage basis since "a similar result could have been
achieved much earlier in the litigation. '9 3
A third explanation for judicial hesitation is that appointing a
magistrate or master decreases the judge's ability to exercise con-
trol over the eventual fee award to strong-arm the plaintiffs' attor-
neys into a settlement. Such strong-arm tactics are not necessarily
desirable since they force the attorney to conform his actions to
the desires of the judge, rather than the client. Victor Yannacone,
one of the Agent Orange attorneys, claimed that depending on his
view of the proposed settlement, "he would be rewarded or pun-
ished for his position when the judge came to award fees. '9 4 As
Peter Schuck notes in his book, Agent Orange on Trial:
[T]he judge, because he has staked his credibility on a difficult set-
tlement or for some other reason, may acquire a strong interest in a
particular outcome. It is often easy for dissidents to portray the
judge in such cases as having used the formidable powers ... espe-
cially control over appointment and discharge of the [plaintiff's
management committee] and over fees as instruments to gratify his
of a special master exercising increased authority on behalf of the court, see Cosgrove v.
Sullivan, 759 F. Supp. 166, 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (threatening to appoint special master to
oversee Medicare payments to class unless HHS takes prompt action).
91. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. (Lindy I), 487
F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1973). Other courts, however, have allowed expert testimony. See, e.g.,
Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Marion, 893 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1990) (allowing an expert witnesses
to testify at Rule 11 evidentiary hearing held before a magistrate); Oppenlander v. Standard
Oil Co. (Indiana), 64 F.R.D. 597 (D. Colo. 1974) (allowing attorneys unconnected to the
litigation to testify to risk involved in suit and counsel's competence).
92. In re Activision See. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
93. Id.
94. SCHUCK, supra note 27, at 200.
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desire. Such suspicions, even when unfounded, can contaminate the
case, mocking the court's pretensions of justice. The significance of
innuendo like Yannacone's, therefore, transcends its truth or falsity;
so long as it is even entertained, it will blight the Agent Orange
case.95
Judge Weinstein, in fact, was criticized by many observers for
his strong desire to settle the Agent Orange case. Allowing a neu-
tral extrajudicial officer, such as a magistrate or master, to decide
such a sensitive issue as attorneys' fees enhances the appearance of
judicial neutrality and reduces unreasonable pressures on the at-
torneys to settle the case.
A final issue is the cost associated with using a magistrate or
master. While the cost of a magistrate usually is borne by the judi-
cial system, masters can be paid by the parties or "out of any fund
or subject matter of the action, which is in the custody and control
of the court."9" In Pray v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., the master's
fee of $103,000 was charged to plaintiffs' counsel.9 7 In Young v.
Pierce,9e both plaintiff and defendant were required to contribute
$12,500 to compensate the court-appointed master. More often,
the master is paid out of the common settlement fund since the
master presumably is providing a service for the entire class.
But payment can be a problem when settlement creates no com-
mon fund. In Trout v. Ball, a sex discrimination case involving the
United States Navy, the court recognized this problem and after
determining the Navy's liability, ordered the government to pay
the cost of the master appointed to decide individual back pay
claims.99 The costs of a master, however, can be quite high. Ken-
neth Feinberg, one of the masters in the Agent Orange case, and
other members of his firm received more than $3 million in fees
and expenses. 100 In any evaluation of the cost of extrajudicial of-
95. Id.; see Kane, supra note 6, at 407 ("[i]f the public perceives that the court has be-
come a participant, rather than an independent arbiter, that itself may undermine the in-
tegrity of the process").
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a).
97. 644 F. Supp. 1289, 1291 n.1 (D.D.C. 1986).
98. 640 F. Supp. 1476, 1478 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
99. 705 F. Supp. 705, 708 (D.D.C. 1989). The court also ruled that paying the master a
$200 hourly fee was appropriate and that the master should be compensated monthly by the
government. Id. at 709.
100. Labaton, supra note 10, at Dl, D2. Mr. Feinberg was not only criticized for his high
fees but also for appointing Aetna Life and Casualty, one of the major insurers of the de-
fendant chemical companies, to process the veterans' claims. Id. at D2.
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ficers, however, the liberation of judges' time to work on other is-
sues should be taken into account. 101
But freeing up the time of judges through the use of magistrates
and masters should not been seen as a judicial abdication of
power. 102 Judges should continue to be involved intimately in su-
pervising the pretrial preparation of the case and discussing possi-
ble settlements with the attorneys. 103 An extrajudicial actor should
act as a "neutral observer to gather facts and to propose a practical
solution to a difficult problem. '10 4
Judges should continue to wield their enormous power and pres-
tige, something masters and magistrates do not possess. A Brook-
ings Institution task force noted:
Magistrates can and do fulfill a valuable function in alleviating
judges' work loads by performing many critical nonjudicial tasks
• ..[But] the notion that by assuming core judicial functions magis-
trates can economize on judicial resources is fundamentally flawed.
Decisions by magistrates on matters of importance - for example,
summary judgment motions - are often appealed to the supervising
judge, requiring the parties to brief and argue the same questions
twice. In addition, active judicial management of cases can prevent
lengthy disputes between counsel for the parties before magistrates
over minor procedural issues.10
Attorneys' fees are an example of the type of "critical nonjudicial
task" that can best be performed by a magistrate or master.
Finally, a related alternative is to hire more support staff to aid
the judge. The Brookings report proposed that "relatively modest"
increases in administrative staff, computer facilities, and software
support can make "substantial improvements" in the judicial sys-
101. See Berger, Away from the Court House and Into the Field: The Odyssey of a Spe-
cial Master, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 707, 737-38 (1978) (stating that masters can undertake "com-
plex fact-gathering ... more economically" than judges).
102. "[T]he delegation of pretrial tasks to magistrates is simply part of a much larger
trend in the judicial community toward informalism, flexible dispute resolution practices,
concern for improved efficiency, and experimentation based on research and development."
Seron, supra note 6, at 567.
103. See Kane, supra note 6, at 407 ("The judge should not delegate this [supervisory]
responsibility to a master or magistrate because it is not a question of ruling on issues that
may be sent to another independent professional and then reviewed by the court."); MAN-
uAL, supra note 25, § 20.14 ("Judicial supervision in complex litigation should ordinarily be
exercised directly by the judge rather than by referral to a magistrate or master").
104. Young v. Pierce, 640 F. Supp. 1476, 1484 n. 9 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
105. BROOKINGs REPORT, supra note 7, at 28 (emphasis added).
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tern.106 In the Agent Orange case, Judge Weinstein hired three
temporary clerks, all law school graduates awaiting admission to
the bar, to process the fee petitions.10 7 These temporary clerks
were supervised by a senior clerk, while another clerk researched
legal issues related to the petitions. In addition to these five full-
time clerks, a member of the Clerk's Office staff helped organize
the petitions and other submissions by counsel.
III. COURT-APPOINTED CLASS GUARDIANS
In the class action framework, the judge is supposed to act as a
guardian of the class members' interests. 08 With respect to attor-
neys' fees, concern for the fairness to the absent class members
takes on added significance since the attorneys' fees can come di-
rectly from the class compensation. In short, both attorneys and
class members are competing for the same pool of money:
In these situations, the plaintiffs' attorney's role changes from one
of a fiduciary for the clients to that of a claimant against the fund
created for the clients' benefit. The perspective of the judge also
changes because the court now must ... act as a fiduciary for those
who are supposed to benefit from it, since typically no one else is
available to perform that function - the defendant has no interest
in how the fund is distributed and the plaintiff class members rarely
become involved. 109
The procedural safeguard of providing notice to the class mem-
bers is inadequate, since intervention is both intimidating and
costly." ' While class members theoretically are free to challenge
106. Id. at 30-31.
107. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 272 n.120 (citing In re "Agent Orange" Prods.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 226 (2d
Cir. 1987).
108. See e.g., In re Gould See. Litig., 727 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (N.D. IlM. 1989) ("[T]his
court must act as 'fiduciary for the fund's beneficiaries and must carefully monitor disburse-
ment to the attorneys by scrutinizing the fee applications,"' (quoting Skelton v. General
Motors Corp., 860 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1988))); Grunin v. International House of Pan-
cakes, 513 F.2d 114, 116 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that under Rule 23(e), "[the] district court
acts as a fiduciary which must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.").
109. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 255. In the Agent Orange case, however, one of
the defendants filed a brief challenging the fee award, but this was done more out of spite.
ScHucK, supra note 27, at 196.
110. Lazos, supra note 47, at 324; see, e.g., Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 294,
295 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting only one class member appearing at a settlement meeting to
object to fee petition).
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any settlement and fee award, the reality is far different since class
members lack "the necessary knowledge, interest, or ability to ex-
ercise vigorous control.""' The court in the WICAT Securities
case 112 ruled:
Although this court agrees that responses by the class [to a proposed
fee award] would have been a relevant consideration it does not nec-
essarily follow that the failure to respond is particularly meaningful.
Class litigation is a process that seems strange to many class mem-
bers and participation in that process would seem to be fairly intim-
idating. Accordingly, failure by the class to object to a 16% fee is
not persuasive evidence that further enhancement is appropriate in
this case.1 13
Another very real problem in statutory fee cases is when plain-
tiffs' attorneys trade a settlement which is unfavorable to the class
for an agreement with higher attorneys' fees." 4 Even in the ab-
sence of collusion, there is a possibility that attorneys will accept a
small settlement in order to ensure some fees, rather than risk los-
ing at trial and recovering nothing. In short, the court must simul-
taneously scrutinize any settlement under Rule 23(d) and try to
protect the interests of the class. 1 5 These are two very different
hats for a judge to wear.
Consequently, the Manual for Complex Litigation has approved
the use of court-appointed "special counsels" to represent the class
in order to preserve the adversarial nature of the proceedings."'
111. Lazos, supra note 47, at 318. "Because the individual class member's settlement
award tends to be small, no member is financially motivated to expend the time and effort
required to supervise the attorney closely. Moreover, any increase in the settlement award
derived from close supervision of the attorney must be shared with all other class members,
making it unlikely that the benefits of supervision will outweigh the costs." Id. at 319.
112. In re WICAT Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 726 (D. Utah 1987).
113. Id. at 741.
114. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d
1015 (3d Cir. 1977).
115. "[T]he unethical attorney can too easily circumvent the safeguards of Rule 23. These
weaknesses lead to abuse of the class action process." Lazos, supra note 47, at 316. Further-
more, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which is geared toward traditional
litigation, provides little guidance to the class action attorney faced with a conflict of inter-
est. Id. at 317; see Alexander v. Chicago Park Dist., 927 F.2d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir. 1991)
(district court must closely scrutinize fee agreements which place counsel and class in adver-
sarial relationship).
116. MANUAL, supra note 25, § 24.13; see also Lazos, supra note 47, at 322 ("IT]he lack of
'adversarialness' in the pretrial class action settlement process forces the court into an un-
justified passivity").
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The guardian can serve as "devil's advocate" both to safeguard the
interests of the absentee class and to provide more information to
the court.117 Similarly, the Third Circuit task force recommends
appointing "a non-judicial representative - who typically will be
an attorney" to negotiate the fee with plaintiffs' counsel."18 As soon
as possible, a guardian should be appointed to work throughout
the case to monitor the actions of counsel. The Third Circuit re-
port recommends that the guardian work with the plaintiffs' coun-
sel "immediately after the pleadings are closed and before discov-
ery is fully underway.""'  There necessarily will be some overlap if
a magistrate or master is also employed.
The initial work of a guardian, however, should be cursory, since
a guardian need not be involved intimately in the pretrial process
to be able to scrutinize a final fee application. As long as contem-
poraneous time records are required with recording by activity (see
Section VI below) and the guardian has a knowledge of the issues
involved in the case, he should be able to challenge duplicative and
otherwise questionable charges. A guardian should also be present
at any settlement negotiations with defendants to ensure that if
attorneys' fees are discussed, no collusion is involved. 120 Though a
guardian is appointed by the court, it should be made clear that
the guardian's first obligation is to the class.
The importance of an adversarial relationship in the fee process
cannot be underestimated. In Trist v. First Federal Savings &
117. Lazos envisions a more neutral role for the guardian, a role in which "[t]he guardian
would not be a party to the proceedings, but a friend of the court - a fact finder." Lazos,
supra note 47, at 326-27. Such a role closely resembles that of a magistrate or master, and
thus this paper opts for a different role for a guardian. In fact, Lazos writes, "Courts already
make extensive use of neutral third parties as fact finders in the class action process [with]
the appointment of magistrates, masters, and expert witnesses to help manage the class
action device." Id. at 327 n.107.
118. Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 256.
119. Id. at 255 n.62. Some judicial members of the Third Circuit task force preferred
waiting until "the case is better formed," while the attorneys on the task force wanted the
percentage issue determined as early as possible. Id.
120. "Adding a third party to the negotiating process could be seen as an infringement on
the private negotiating rights of the parties. However, the confidentiality... is not necessa-
rily justified in the class action context ... [which involves] the interests of the absentee
class members and society's interest in preventing abuse of the class action mechanism."
Lazos, supra note 47, at 332; cf. Panola Land Buying Ass'n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1518-20
(11th Cir. 1988) (stating that a judge should deal with the problems of negotiation of settle-
ment and fees simultaneously under the authority of Rule 16). Professors Macey and Miller
advocates a limited experiment of using guardians in the settlement process, although they
express no view on their sue in the fee process. Macey & Miller, supra note 30, at 47-48.
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Loan Association of Chester,121 fee petitions were presented ex
parte to the court. Without the benefit of adversarial arguments,
the court lamented its sole reliance on a "cold record of hours and
tasks performed, albeit in this case a detailed and thoroughly doc-
umented one. .. 122 Consequently the court approved generous
fees, based on counsel's good faith, "uncommon dedication to the
interests of the clients," and "restraint" in hours billed.123 Courts,
however, should be wary of relying on counsel's professed good
faith, despite one court's belief that attorneys are in a position of
"public trust" and "share[] with the court the burden of protecting
the class action device against public apprehensions that it encour-
ages strike suits and excessive attorneys' fees.' i 4 The potential for
attorney abuse is simply too high.
As with the appointment of masters and magistrates, judges are
reluctant to appoint class guardians. In the Federal Judicial Center
study, 87.5% of the judges (fifty-six of sixty-four) have never ap-
pointed a guardian, and only 9.4% sometimes appointed them.125 A
survey of reported cases reveals that there are few examples of
judges appointing a class guardian in a fees dispute. The two most
often cited cases are Miller v. Mackey International, Inc.126 and
Haas v. Pittsburgh National Bank. 27 In both cases, there was a
concern that the judge could not be an adequate advocate for the
class without undermining his impartial position.12 8 Only the ap-
pointment of a guardian could "obviate[] this considerable prob-
lem of judicial schizophrenia.' ' 2  The success in these two cases
should have motivated other judges to experiment with this device,
but that has not happened.
In Meyer v. Citizens and Southern National Bank, Lee Red-
mond, Jr., was appointed guardian ad litem "to represent the in-
terests of unborn, unknown, incompetent, and minor members of
the plaintiff class" in evaluating the fairness of a settlement which
121. 89 F.R.D. 8 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
122. Id. at 10.
123. Id. at 10, 13.
124. Zeffiro v. First Pa. Bank, 581 F. Supp. 811, 812 (1983) (quoting Alpine Pharmacy v.
Charles Pfizer & Co., 481 F.2d 1045, 1050 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1092 (1973)).
125. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 16, at 226.
126. 70 F.R.D. 533, 536 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (stating that the 1845 hours billed to the class
"lack[ed] credulity").
127. 77 F.R.D. 382 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
128. See id. at 383; Miller, 70 F.R.D. at 535.
129. Haas, 77 F.R.D. at 383.
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included a provision for attorneys' fees. 130 The extent of Red-
mond's independent inquiry is unclear from the published opinion,
but the opinion does note that he was present at the fairness hear-
ing and was able to conclude that adequate notice had been given
and that the proposed settlement was fair.
A more obvious use of a guardian ad litem was in Pray v. Lock-
heed Aircraft, in which the guardian represented the estates of
seventy-six children killed in an airplane accident.' 3 ' Here, the
guardian, Charles R. Work, represented the interests of the dece-
dents throughout the litigation, rather than merely at the attor-
neys' fees process. The cost of the guardian was "the relatively
modest amount" of $92,000 and was paid out of the class
settlement.'32
As with the use of masters and magistrates, the cost of the
guardian should come out of the general class fund, 33 but judges
should pay careful attention to limiting the amount of compensa-
ble time to the guardian,'3 4 particularly if other non-judicial of-
ficers, such as masters, also are examining the fee petitions. If the
guardian's responsibility goes beyond the role of an advocate and
includes checking the fee petition, judges should exercise greater
latitude in paying the guardian. In most cases, however, a fixed
salary seems appropriate, with adjustments if necessary.3 5
For the appointment of a guardian to be effective, the costs of
the guardian's work must not outweigh the benefits. As is appar-
ent, the benefits are more evident in complex cases where the at-
torneys' fees are high, and where closer scrutiny of the fee peti-
tions may decrease the eventual award. There is also the
possibility, however, that a guardian can provide a less tangible,
130. 677 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (M.D. Ga. 1988). The settlement provided $25 million to the
class, $7 million to attorneys' fees and $625,000 for attorney expenses. Id. at 1204.
131. 644 F. Supp. 1289 (D.D.C. 1986).
132. Id. at 1309-10. The $92,000 included a 20 percent "bonus" of slightly more than
$15,000 for risks incurred in the litigation. This same bonus was given to all the plaintiff's
lawyers. Id. at 1310.
133. In Meyer the guardian's fees and expenses of $19,265.57 were paid out of the interest
from the settlement fund. Meyer, 677 F. Supp. at 1213. In both Haas and Miller, the guard-
ian's fee was charged against the common fund. Lazos, supra note 47, at 331. Lazos' propo-
sal that one percent of the fund be set aside for paying the guardian seems problematic,
since the guardian's compensation should not be contingent on the final settlement. Id.
134. See Third Circuit Report, 108 F.R.D. at 257 ("[T]he court should fix a limit on
compensable time, an hourly fee limit, or a total fee limit on the representative"). The
Third Circuit did not reach a consensus on who should pay the guardian's fees.
135. See Lazos, supra note 47, at 331.
1991]
66 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
non-monetary benefit, that is, to "protect against abuse in fee re-
quests and, perhaps as importantly, provide an independent adver-
sary to the fee request, avoiding the appearance of impropriety
that results from large unopposed fee awards."'136 Though the im-
portance of safeguarding the class' interests cannot be underesti-
mated, the Federal Judicial Center report rightly questions
whether such a function could be performed equally well by mas-
ters or magistrates. 137 It is up to the individual judge's preference
as to whether he uses a disinterested observer (e.g., magistrate or
master) or an interested advocate (e.g., guardian).
IV. PRETRIAL FEE CONFERENCES
By exercising tight control early in the litigation, courts will be
able to compel class action lawyers to stay abreast of these cases,
keep fees down, and most importantly, to keep the cases moving
along. Arguably, tight judicial management should force attorneys to
become better case managers. One of the most effective means
courts have to force lawyers to become better managers is their con-
trol over fees. 3"
Judges should exercise their case management authority under
Rule 16 to control attorneys' fees from the outset; the 1983 amend-
ments specifically contemplated the use of pretrial conferences to
achieve this goal. Of particular relevance to the attorneys' fees
question are Rule 16(a)(2) "establishing early and continuing con-
trol so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of man-
agement"; (a)(3) "discouraging wasteful pretrial activities"; (c)(6)
"the advisability of referring matters to a magistrate or master";
and (c)(10) "the need for adopting special procedures for managing
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex
issues."'13 The Manual for Complex Litigation states: "At the out-
136. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 16, at 232 (citation omitted); see also
Rothfarb v. Hambrecht, 641 F. Supp. 71, 74 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("this Court is keenly aware of
its duty to protect the absent plaintiff class members, and determined to avoid... even the
appearance of having awarded windfall fees"); In re Capital Underwriters, Inc. Sec. Litig.,
519 F. Supp. 92, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd in part, remanded in part, 705 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.
1983) ("Excessive fees have a broader detrimental effect as well on the continued usefulness
of the class action mechanism since such awards provoke criticism of the legal professions
and class representation in particular.").
137. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 16, at 232.
138. Kane, supra note 6, at 391.
139. FED. R. CIv. P. 16.
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set of any litigation in which it may be called upon to review or
award attorneys' fees, the court should institute procedures that
will not only be useful in later determining these awards but also
deter wasteful expenditures of time and money by counsel.' 140
The support for active pretrial management is broad-based. Ac-
cording to the 1988 Harris survey, more than eighty percent of liti-
gators and judges favored "the concept of increasing the role of
federal judges as active case managers."1 41 One litigation manual
noted: "To avoid abuse, disappointment and unnecessary contro-
versy, the procedures for eventual fee determination should be dis-
cussed at a status conference early in the litigation.' ' 42 And the
Eighth Circuit, in affirming a district court's reduction of fees for
attorney misconduct, noted that "[i]n almost all cases the key to
avoiding excessive costs and delay is stringent judicial manage-
ment of the case.'1
43
Pretrial conferences and orders should provide clear guidelines
to the attorneys on: acceptable billing rates; what functions can be
performed by different attorneys (i.e., what are appropriate tasks
to be performed by partners); the number of attorneys allowed to
attend court appearances or depositions; what type of records must
be submitted (e.g., contemporaneous time sheets); how often and
to whom these records should be submitted; what time will and
will not be compensated (e.g., review of documents); the use of
paralegals; how the litigation will be structured to minimize attor-
neys' fees (e.g., designation of lead counsel); and what aspects of
case administration (e.g., preparing and reviewing fee petitions)
will be compensated.14 4 If an extrajudicial officer is employed (e.g.,
140. MANuAL, supra note 25, § 24.2.
141. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 7, at 25. The report concluded that "[m]uch unneces-
sary cost and delay can be avoided at the outset of many cases through sensible case man-
agement evaluation and scheduling techniques." Id. at 23.
142. Wmu A M SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION 190
(1982); see also Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981).
143. Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, 710 F.2d 455, 463 (8th Cir. 1983).
144. See SCHWARZER, supra note 142, at 191. The Manual for Complex Litigation (Sec-
ond) gives an example of sample pretrial guidelines relating to attorneys fees in § 24.22 and
the responsibilities of lead counsel in § 41.31. See also In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel
Fire Litig., 768 F. Supp. 912, 918 n.17, 919 (D.P.R. 1991) (coordinating discovery of both
plaintiff's and defendant's attorneys); In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Business
Sec. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (approving plaintiff's steering committee as
lead counsel in a pretrial order).
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masters, magistrates and guardians), the court should establish the
precise role that the officer will play in the litigation. 145 Addition-
ally, the judge should require that any private fee-sharing arrange-
ments be disclosed at the conference. 146
Several judges have used pretrial orders to avoid potentially pro-
tracted fee disputes. The most notable example is the Continental
Illinois Securities case. 47 Judge John Grady issued a pretrial or-
der setting out the tasks for which lawyers would be compensated,
specifying that "attorneys should work independently," and that
only one attorney would be compensated for a court appearance,
deposition or pretrial conference. 48 Senior partners would be com-
pensated at their usual rates only when doing work meriting the
attention of a senior partner. 49 Grady warned against unnecessary
research on legal issues "which [are] well known to practitioners in
the areas of law involved," and stressed that attorneys would not
be compensated for reviewing another's work. 150 Finally, the order
cautioned against too much communication among the lawyers: "If
the attorneys for the class are competent, there is no need for a
legion of other lawyers to be looking over their shoulders; if they
are not competent, the legion will do no good anyway." ''
Grady's order received widespread attention. Professor Kane
commented on the case: "[Grady's] message was clear: lawyers
have the responsibility to develop more efficient means of coordi-
nating and managing complex class actions, and the failure to do
145. For an example of a pretrial order relating to special masters, see Young v. Pierce,
640 F. Supp. 1476 (E.D. Tex 1986). See MANUAL, supra note 25, § 20.14 ("If matters are to
be referred, the court should enter an order that adequately describe what is being referred
and, to the extent not covered by existing rules, the authority of the magistrate or master to
make rulings and the procedures for obtaining review by the judge.").
146. In Agent Orange, the plaintiffs fee-sharing arrangement was disclosed to Judge
Weinstein only after a settlement had been reached. Weinstein's decision to uphold the
arrangement was reversed by the Second Circuit which ruled that such plans must be dis-
closed. 818 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir. 1987). See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litig.
(Appeal of Dean), 818 F.2d 216, 226 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Only by reviewing the [fee] agreement
prospectively will the district courts to be able to prevent potential conflicts from
arising....").
147. In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. IlM. 1983). Note the similari-
ties between Judge Grady's order and the sample guidelines in the Manual for Complex
Litigation. See MANUAL, supra note 25, § 24.22.
148. In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. at 933.
149. Id. at 933.
150. Id. at 933-34.
151. Id. at 934. Other aspects of the order included tightening controls over expenses,
requiring contemporaneous time records, and limiting communications between counsel and
plaintiff class.
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so will not be at the expense of the class of the opposing party."152
Grady's order led Thomas Willging to survey reactions to this type
of pretrial management. 5 The thirty-nine attorneys in the survey
felt that: Grady's order was fair to both the client and the attor-
ney; such orders could be extended easily to most other types of
litigation; plaintiff's lawyers would not be deterred from initiating
litigation; and most importantly, these pretrial orders could result
in substantial cost savings (the average estimate was a fifty percent
reduction in fees and expenses).1 54 Many of the attorneys in Willg-
ing's survey justified such pretrial orders by noting that defense
counsel is not always given free rein in billing. In-house counsel
impose similar restrictions on outside firms, while senior partners
of a law firm usually issue billing guidelines to members of their
firm.155 Therefore, any incidental restrictions on plaintiffs' lawyers
would not put them at a significant disadvantage vis-a-vis their
adversaries.
Another case which used pretrial orders to control attorneys'
fees was In re American Integrity Securities Litigation,5 6 in
which the court made two pretrial orders designating the lead
counsel and the process by which contemporaneous time records
would be submitted. The attorneys were ordered to submit time
records to lead counsel within twenty days after the end of each
month; the lead counsel was then to submit all the time records
within thirty days after each month. Implicit in this order was that
lead counsel was to check each time record: "said submission is a
representation that the time spent as submitted was reasonable
and necessary." The court also ruled that any time not submitted
originally or without adequate documentation would be disallowed;
time submitted late might be compensated but no multiplier would
be awarded for this time.157
152. Kane, supra note 6, at 393.
153. See Wiliging, supra note 51. "The overwhelming majority of lawyers interviewed ex-
pressed appreciation for the concept of the order and applauded the judicial recognition of
the need for such an order." Id. at 11.
154. Id. at 7-9. For specific comments of survey participants, see id. at 15-34.
155. Id. at 8. But note that defense counsel usually outspends plaintiff's counsel. In Agent
Orange, defense counsel spent between $75 million and $100 million, while plaintiffs' coun-
sel spent $13 million. Labaton, supra note 10, at D2.
156. Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,738 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1989).
157. See SCHWARTZER, supra note 142, app. at 211-410 (giving several examples of pretrial
orders in complex antitrust litigation); General Management Order No. 1 (July 29, 1974), In
re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., reprinted in WILLIAM SCHWARTZER, MANAGING
ANTIrRUST AND OTHER ComPLx LITIGATION (1982) app. at 211-21 (1982); Pretrial Order No.
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In Fisher Bros. v. Cambridge Lee Industries,5" Judge Norma
Shapiro issued several pretrial orders "to ensure as little duplica-
tion of effort as possible by the 23 firms serving as counsel. . . and
in anticipation of [the] fee petition." These orders appointed co-
lead counsels and their responsibilities, required contemporaneous
time records "specifically describing the tasks performed," and de-
scribed the process by which fee petitions would be submitted to
the court - a process similar to the one used in American Integ-
rity Securities. One of the co-lead counsels was responsible specifi-
cally for reviewing the time records before filing to ensure that
hours were "spent appropriately and for the benefit of plaintiff and
the class it seeks to represent." Judge Shapiro's overall purpose in
issuing the orders was unmistakable: "No fees shall be allowed for
time which is not documented in this matter.' 15 9
But pretrial orders can also involve the judge too intimately in
the details of the case as happened in the WICAT Securities
case.16 0 Not only did Judge Thomas Greene appoint a lead counsel
and liaison counsel, but he also assigned responsibilities for differ-
ent parts of the case to each of the nine law firms representing the
plaintiff. These responsibilities included: discovery of third parties,
discovery of the underwriters, discovery of the defendant, prepara-
tion of class action certification, preparation of the amended com-
plaint, and entering necessary stipulations. An order of such detail
decreases the possibility of duplicative work, but it also restricts
the autonomy of lawyers to develop litigation strategy on their
own, while raising questions about the judge's impartiality.
In defining the scope of pretrial orders, judges must be careful
not to harm the legitimate interests of either the client or the at-
torney. While the vast majority of the attorneys in the Willging
survey felt pretrial orders were necessary to control fees, "[in]ore
than half of the respondents favorable to . . . [Judge Grady's] or-
der tempered their applause with a concern that the order was un-
duly rigid, impractical, or restrictive of quality legal representa-
1 (July 2, 1976); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., reprinted in WILLIAM SCHWARZER,
MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION app. at 223-37 (1982).
158. No. 82-4921, 1987 WL 26480 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1987).
159. In her final award, Judge Shapiro not only disallowed all inadequately documented
hours but also hours contained in any time record submitted late. The only exception for
this stringent rule was for the time records submitted to co-lead counsel on time but not
filed on time "due to the inadvertence of co-lead counsel or the Clerk of the court." Id. at
*12.
160. In re WICAT Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 726 (D. Utah 1987).
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tion."' 6'e There was some concern that the plaintiff's bar would be
placed in a dilemma: play by the judge's rules and operate at a
disadvantage against defendant's lawyers who have greater overall
resources, or continue billing the same amount of hours and risk
not being compensated.16 2 On an objective level, such concerns are
probably overstated since most plaintiffs' attorneys are amply
compensated, perhaps even overcompensated. And a central tenet
of this article has been that lawyers are not able to adequately po-
lice themselves. Furthermore, it is doubtful that any litigation will
be deterred merely by more active pretrial management.
V. COURT-APPOINTED LEAD COUNSEL
One of the inherent difficulties in complex litigation, particularly
multidistrict litigation, is the large number of attorneys involved
and their lack of accountability to their clients. "Class litigation
requires a degree of organization and tight management by lawyers
that seldom is necessary in an ordinary two-party lawsuit." 6 3 The
Agent Orange and Fine Paper cases provide telling examples of
too many lawyers spoiling the broth. As one court noted almost a
century ago:
[T]here can be but one master of a litigation on the side of the
plaintiffs. It is also plain that it would be as easy to drive a span of
horses pulling in diverging directions, as to conduct a litigation by
separate, independent action of various plaintiffs, acting without
concert, and with possible discord.164
Consequently, some judges act under the implicit authority of Rule
42(a) to appoint a lead counsel. 6 5 Others use Rules 23(d)(1) and
(3) to designate a lead counsel and "to restrict the activities of
those attorneys who represent individual class members but who
are not lead counsel for the class itself.' 66 Whatever the justifica-
161. Willging, supra note 51, at 11.
162. Id. at 12-13.
163. Kane, supra note 6, at 389.
164. Manning v. Mercantile Trust Co., 57 N.Y.S. 467, 468 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1899); see also
Kane, supra note 6, at 390 ("Lawyers have been slow to recognize the need to be more
economical and coordinated in their preparation for class action litigation ... perhaps re-
vealing some disturbing features about the bar as a whole.").
165. See e.g., MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958).
166. County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 (E.D.N.Y.
1989).
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tion, lead counsel should be appointed as soon as possible.1 7
The Manual for Complex Litigation suggests some of the various
responsibilities which can be assigned to lead counsel: coordinating
the filing of motions; maintaining an orderly discovery process;
conducting settlement negotiations; and delegating work assign-
ments."l 8 The lead counsel is essential to an orderly fees process,
since he coordinates the activities of the attorneys and lessens the
possibility of excessive or duplicative work.16e Time records, for ex-
ample, should be submitted to a lead counsel who reviews and sub-
mits them to the court.17 0 While there is no clear consensus about
how much authority the lead counsel should be given, the Ninth
Circuit in Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc.17 1 upheld an order
that forbade non-lead counsel from initiating discovery or filing
motions without the permission of the lead counsel.
Whenever possible, courts should appoint lead counsel instead of
allowing the attorneys to appoint one themselves. Even if a judge
simply ratifies the lead counsel nominated by the attorneys, judi-
cial appointment will strengthen the authority of a lead counsel,
thus lessening conflict and dissension among the plaintiffs' attor-
neys. A lead counsel who is elected by the other attorneys will
often be forced to cut deals over how work will be distributed in
order to get votes. Judicial appointment also is more likely to pre-
vent the proliferation of subcommittees, delegation of responsibili-
ties, and duplication of work which characterized the Fine Paper
litigation.172 The importance of judicial appointment is reflected in
167. See e.g., Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, 714 F. Supp. 460 (D. Kan. 1988) (advising
plaintiff's counsel to have lead counsel selected before pretrial conference in which discovery
was set); In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig., reprinted in WILLIAM SCHWARTZER,
MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION, at app. 211-14 (1982) (establishing
committee structure in a complex antitrust suit with a pretrial order); and In re Folding
Carton Antitrust Litig. reprinted in WELIAM SCHWARTZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER
COMPLEX LITIGATION, at app. 229-30 (1982).
168. MANUAL, supra note 25, § 41.31.
169. The Manual for Complex Litigation also provides that lead counsel can be responsi-
ble to "monitor the activities of co-counsel to assure that schedules are met and unnecessary
expenditures of time and expense are avoided." Id.
170. In re American Integrity Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,738 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
8, 1989).
171. 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977).
172. As the most incredible example of abuse, Kane cites the 1500 hours spent by nine
law firms to prepare and take the deposition of one third-party witness. Kane, supra note 6,
at 390 (citing In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.D.R. 48, 75 (D. Pa. 1983)). Several
courts have gone the opposite direction, believing that many subclasses all represented by
separate counsel can best eliminate any conflicts of interest. Id. at 401.
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the change between the first and second Manuals for Complex Lit-
igation: the second gives this authority to appoint lead counsel to
the court, while the first Manual left this responsibility to the
attorneys." 3
In many complex suits, the litigation is handled either formally
or informally by a committee.17 4 It is important, then, that the
court recognize this situation and try to provide a sense of order. 175
If a judge agrees to a committee structure, it should be allowed
only in conjunction with a lead counsel. The Agent Orange case
demonstrated the danger of a committee system without a leader.
In the Exxon Valdez case, the co-lead counsels are delegating the
responsibilities of pleadings, depositions, documents, pretrial mo-
tions, and defense motions to dismiss to the many subcommittees
and task forces.7'7 But the appointment of two lead counsels in
this case has not eliminated conflicts among the eighty-four law
firms involved. As an attorney for Exxon noted, "There were more
papers filed by plaintiff lawyers questioning the role and qualifica-
tions of other plaintiff lawyers than anything else in this case....
A lot of energy was spent on the subject of which lawyers have
what responsibilities. I still would not characterize them as a uni-
fied front.' 77
In other cases a separate liaison counsel has been appointed to
173. See MANUAL, supra note 25, § 41.31 (showing a sample order setting out the respon-
sibilities of lead counsel).
174. "Even where the court does not formally appoint liaison counsel or lead counsel,
everything in an antitrust class action is handled by committee, anyway." Dando B. Cellini,
An Overview of Antitrust Class Actions, 49 ANTITRUST 1501, 1505 (1980). The virtues of the
committee system have been extolled by many courts:
The benefits derived from a committee of attorneys would outweigh any prejudices
which could otherwise occur to individual counsel or their clients in limiting their
participation. Full participation by each individual plaintiffs' counsel would likely re-
sult in numerous attorneys each vying for the attention of the Court, zealously repre-
senting the interests of their individual cases and possibly leading to the presentation
of confusing and conflicting theories. Clearly, this would be detrimental to the inter-
ests of the larger group of plaintiffs. Experience has shown that this small cadre of
attorneys, as compared to the free-for-all participation of all attorneys, has better
served the interests of all parties as well as those of the Court.
In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 768 F. Supp. 912, 918 (D.P.R. 1991).
175. See, e.g., San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 768 F. Supp. at 918-19 (describ-
ing appointment and responsibilities of eleven-member steering committee); In re Union
Carbide Corp. Consumer Prod. Business Sec. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (ap-
proving plaintiff's steering committee as lead counsel); Asbeston Counsel, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
21, 1991, at 2 (Judge Weiner naming 13-member plaintiffs' steering committee).
176. Berger, supra note 8, at 16.
177. Id. at 14; see also Dickstein's Snow Job, LEGAL TnMzs, Feb. 26, 1990, at 3.
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communicate with both other attorneys and the class members. 7 8
While communication is important, particularly in a large class ac-
tion suit, there is also the danger that too many billable hours will
be consumed by needless communication. The Manual for Com-
plex Litigation echoes this sentiment:
[S]ound judgment and discretion must be exercised by lead and liai-
son counsel in communicating with other attorneys in the group. Pe-
riodic, concise notices and reports of major activities in the litigation
are useful in keeping other counsel informed, particularly if they
may be called upon to perform assigned tasks from time to time,
such as conducting a deposition. However, furnishing all counsel
with copies of all briefs, motions, orders, correspondence, and the
like will be inefficient and uneconomical - one of the principal rea-
sons for designating counsel to act on behalf of others is to save the
time that would be wasted if many attorneys had to read identical
documents. 179
As for notices to the class, attorneys should notify class members
of important events in the litigation, such as a proposed settle-
ment. Indeed, Rule 23 requires such notice. But judges should cau-
tion attorneys against consulting class members on every decision.
As Judge Grady noted in his Continental Illinois order, "Class
members should be kept apprised of the progress of the litigation,
but in no greater detail or frequency than the typical client is kept
advised by his attorney. Periodic informational mailings to the
class should suffice."' 80
The work of lead and liaison counsel also can continue after the
litigation ends. In the Dalkon Shield cases, lead counsel, along
with two court-appointed masters, conducted and catalogued dis-
covery. After some suits were settled before Judge Miles Lord, the
discovery information was made available to the attorneys who had
not settled. 181 Another interesting variation of using lead counsel
178. See e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 768 F. Supp. at 919 (describ-
ing responsibilities of liaison counsel); In re Chrysler Motors Corp. Overnight Evaluation
Program Litig., 736 F. Supp. 1007 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (appointing both lead counsel and liaison
counsel); In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. IM. 1983) (appointing two
liaison counsel originally, although appointment subsequently vacated).
179. MANUAL, supra note 25, § 24.23.
180. In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 572 F. Supp. at 928 (N.D. IlM. 1983). In the Federal
Judicial Center Study conducted by Thomas Willging, this aspect of Judge Grady's pretrial
order was one of the most sharply criticized. Willging, supra note 51.
181. For a description of the proceedings before Judge Lord, see In re A.H. Robins Co.,
880 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. i989).
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was from the Swine Flu Litigation. After the multidistrict litiga-
tion had ended and the suits were returned to the original lawyers,
the lead counsel and steering committee ran schools for the origi-
nal lawyers and provided periodic reports on trials and
settlements.182
Several courts have recognized the importance of the lead coun-
sel's work by compensating the lead counsel at a higher rate. Judge
Marvin Aspen stated in the Gould Securities case that "the
amount of work done and risk undertaken by lead counsel is dis-
proportionately high, and the results in the litigation are largely
attributable to lead counsel's efforts."'183 While this extra compen-
sation may come as a result of a higher hourly rate, courts typically
have used a higher multiplier to compensate lead counsel.184 In the
Gould Securities case, lead counsel was given a 1.75 multiplier,
compared to 1.25 for the rest of the attorneys. 85 The differential
was even more extreme in In re Cenco Inc. Securities Litigation in
which lead counsel received a multiplier twice as high: 4.0 com-
pared to 2.0 for rest of counsel. 86 The Supreme Court, however,
has taken a restrictive view on the use of multipliers: "[A]n up-
ward adjustment of the lodestar may be made, but, as a general
rule, in an amount no more than one-third of the lodestar. Any
additional adjustment would require the most exacting justifica-
tion."'81 7 Lower courts, however, seem largely to have disregarded
182. Paul D. Rheingold & Clifford J. Shoemaker, The Swine Flu Litigation, LMiG., Fall
1981, at 28. 29.
183. In re Gould Sec. Litig., 727 F. Supp. 1201, 1206 (N.D. IM. 1989). For examples of
courts praising lead counsel for their work, see In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig., 660 F.
Supp. 522, 529 (D. Nev. 1987) ("To the court's knowledge, the results of the [plaintiff's lead
committee's] efforts have never been equaled in any other mass disaster litigation... none
of [these cases] have concluded except this one, and from the court's viewpoint, that says it
all."); Dekro v. Stern Bros. & Co., 571 F. Supp. 97, 106 (W.D. Mo. 1983) ("class counsel
prosecuted the case in an economical and efficient manner ... The cost-cutting measures
utilized by class counsel merit an award in addition to the lodestar since the very effect of
these measures was to reduce the lodestar.").
184. The non-lead counsel in the Gould securities litigation argued that different multi-
pliers for lead counsel were unnecessary since they had a higher lodestar which compensated
both the higher risk and the amount of work. The court, however, rejected this argument. In
re Gould Sec. Litig., 727 F. Supp. at 1206.
185. Id. at 1207; see also In re American Integrity Sec. Litig., 1989-90 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) % 94,738 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1989) (awarding lead counsel 2.5 multiplier compared to
2.1 for other counsel because the "increased responsibility" and "success in coordinating
this litigation contributed greatly to the creation and protection of the common fund"); In
re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prod. Business Sec. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (awarding a 2.6 multiplier for lead counsel; 2 for other counsel).
186. 519 F. Supp. 322, 326-28 (N.D. IMI. 1981).
187. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council, 483 U.S. 711, 730 (1987) (opinion
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this standard. 188
A related question is to what extent time spent on administra-
tive responsibilities should be compensated.""9 The Manual for
Complex Litigation is ambiguous, stating only, "[t]he court can
award fees to lead counsel, liaison counsel, and other attorneys
performing tasks on behalf of a group of litigants."'90 In Robinson
v. Ariyoshi,'9' the court reimbursed for the time spent for confer-
ences and correspondence between counsel. The court recognized
that "[iun a case of this magnitude and importance," the attorneys
would have failed in their ethical obligation to their client if there
had not been many and persistent conferences between lead counsel
to make sure that every avenue of law and fact were searched,
researched, and reviewed to make sure there was no hole, loophole,
or pinhole through which the State might escape with its ill-gotten
water.' 92
The Robinson decision probably is limited to cases in which the
lead counsel can prove some dramatic time saving as a result of the
meetings.193 In the Corrugated Container Antitrust case, for exam-
of White, J.).
188. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Kennickell, 684 F. Supp. 1097 (D.D.C. 1988) (justifying up-
ward calculation of lodestar for lead counsel's dedication of 15 years to case), aff'd, 875 F.2d
330 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 749
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (justifying multiplier of 2.26 since counsel constituted "cream of the plain-
tiff's bar"), aff'd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d. Cir. 1986); Edmonds v. United States, 658 F. Supp. 1126,
1149 (D.S.C. 1987) (justifying multiplier of 2.75 to lead counsel "who had the lion's share of
the responsibilities and burdens of this litigation). But see In re Burlington N. Employment
Practices Litig., 810 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding district court's order that lead
counsel not entitled to multiplier), cert. denied sub nom., Sprenger v. Burlington N. Ry.,
484 U.S. 821 (1987). For a detailed list of cases in the 1980's in which multipliers have
exceeded 2.75, see Edmonds, 658 F. Supp. at 1149.
189. See MANUAL, supra note 25, § 20.12. Administration should be distinguished from
time spent preparing and litigating attorneys' fees, which courts generally will not reim-
burse. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.
(Lindy I), 540 F.2d 102, 111 (3d Cir. 1976); MARcus & SHERMAN, supra note 3, at 705.
190. MANUAL, supra note 25, § 24.11; see also id. § 24.12 ("As a touchstone for answering
many of these and other similar questions, judges should look to the bill for services ren-
dered that would properly be submitted to a fee-paying client.").
191. 703 F. Supp. 1412 (D. Haw. 1989), rev'd and vacated on other grounds, 933 F.2d 781
(9th Cir. 1991) (vacating district court's award of attorney's fees for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
192. Id. at 1424. The court, however, rejected timesheet entries which did not specify the
nature of the conferences and correspondence. Id.
193. In Tarver v. City of Houston, 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 37,662 (S.D. Tex. 1987),
the court allowed time for updating files and checking addresses of claimants since "the
integrity of the computer fields" was essential to distributing checks to claimants. Cf. Skel-
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ple, the lead counsel was compensated for monitoring the other
plaintiffs' attorneys and limiting duplication to only four percent
of total time spent by all lawyers. 194 More often, courts are very
suspicious of lead counsel spending large amounts of time review-
ing the work of the other attorneys. In the WICAT Securities
case, 95 Judge Greene cited an example of a document being
drafted in twenty-eight hours but being reviewed for 149 hours. In
reducing the hours by forty percent, he wrote:
The word 'review' seems to be a catchall category with great versa-
tility in counsels' application. It is also a signal for the padding of
hours....
There was considerable review by copnseI who appears to have
taken the laboring oar in this litigation on behalf of the Abbey firm
which served as lead counsel. Much of that time is presumptively
valid but it seems that some of the efficiency in delegating responsi-
bility among plaintiffs' counsel was defeated by such overly exten-
sive review.19 8
Another difficult issue is whether to allow fee agreements among
the lawyers. Such agreements are often disregarded 97 and in some
ton v. General Motors Corp., 661 F. Supp. 1368, 1384-85 (N.D. IMI. 1987) (disallowing 23
hours spent in conferences, including 16.5 hours spent conferring with attorney's partner),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 860 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1988), reh'g denied, No. 87-1404, 1989
U.S. App. LEXIS 648 (7th Cir. 1989); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp.
1296, 1325 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (disallowing time spent in conferences between members of
same firm); Metro Data Sys., Inc. v. Durango Sys., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 244, 246 (D. Ariz. 1984)
(discounting time for 58 telephone conferences between two law firms). But see General
Management Order No. 1 (July 29, 1979), In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litig.
(reimbursing counsel for "the expense and time involved in preparation, duplication and
distribution of court orders, notices, and other papers intended for distribution"), reprinted
in WLIAM SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LMIGATION app. at 215
(1982).
194. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,628 (S.D.
Tex. 1983). See Fisher Bros. v. Cambridge Lee Indus., No. 82-4921, 1987 WL 26480 at *22
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1987) (stating that lead counsel's ability to coordinate 23 law firms "al-
lowed plaintiffs' counsel to act efficiently and with a minimum of unnecessary activities and
protected the fund from unnecessary claims for attorney fees"; adding 1.1 multiplier).
195. In re WICAT Sec. Litig., 671 F. Supp. 726 (D. Utah 1987); see also In re PSFS Sec.
Litig., No. 85-4978, 1987 WL 26282, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 1987) (praising lead counsel for
"not pad[ding] their hours by needlessly reviewing the responses filed by [co-counsel]").
196. 671 F. Supp. at 735-36.
197. In Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein informed plaintiff's counsel that he would nullify
their internal fee-splitting agreement unless they amended it. SCHUCK, supra note 27, at 203.
Under the terms of the original agreement, Weinstein said, "those who advanced money
would be advantaged to an extraordinary degree over those who gave the time and skill to
the enterprise." Id. at 202. Consequently, the agreement was amended to reflect more
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rare instances penalized. 198 Likewise, courts have disagreed on
whether to compensate time spent preparing fee petitions or liti-
gating fee disputes.1 9 This paper will not address either of these
"substantive" issues, since they are beyond the scope of the proce-
dural reforms this paper advocates.
VI. CONTEMPORANEOUS TIME RECORDS
Perhaps, the most commonly used of all the procedural tools is
the requirement.that counsel file contemporaneous time records at
regular intervals. 00 Usually, the requirement is fairly flexible:210 all
that is required is the name of attorney, the number of hours
spent, the billing rate, the description of work performed, and the
date the work was performed. 2  One court interpreted a Second
closely the percentage of the overall fees that each attorney was awarded by Weinstein. Id.
at 203. See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 768 F. Supp. 912, 922 (D.P.R.
1991) (disregarding fee agreements and capping contingency fees at 25% for attorneys rep-
resenting minors and incompetent persons and 33% for other plaintiff attorneys); 'Vultures
Circling,' NAT'L L. J., Oct. 14, 1991, at 2 describing battle of more than 15 attorneys to
enforce fee agreements in $17 million personal injury suit).
198. See, e.g., Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (disregarding
fee agreement among lead counsel and other attorneys and punishing lead counsel by reduc-
tion in fee).
199. See, e.g., Martin v. University of S. Ala., 911 F.2d 604, 610 (11th Cir. 1990) ("It is
well settled that time expended litigating attorney fees is fully compensable."); Rode v. Del-
larciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1192 (3d Cir. 1990) (vacating district court's reduction of time
spent on fee petitions from 101.6 hours to 35 hours); In re Bicoastal Corp., 121 B.R. 653
(Bankr., M.D. Fla. 1990) (entitling attorneys for official creditors in Chapter 11 to fees for
time spent on fee applications).
200. In NYSARC v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1147 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second Circuit noted,
"[W]e think it appropriate to convert our previous expressed preference for contemporane-
ous time records, . . . into a mandatory requirement, as other Circuits have done."
201. "Plaintiff's counsel, of course, is not required to record in great detail how each min-
ute of his time was expended. But at least counsel should identify the general subject mat-
ter of his time expenditures." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 n.12 (1983). For other
cases allowing fees, see Johnson v. Kay, 742 F. Supp. 822, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (allowing
attorneys' fee for reconstructed time records when supplemented by affidavits from attor-
neys); Meriwether v. Coughlin, 727 F. Supp. 823, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (allowing "chronologi-
cal computer printouts" but not "computer printout of its billing memorandum" in the ab-
sence of contemporaneous time records); United States Football League v. National
Football League, 704 F. Supp. 474, 477 (S.D.N.Y.) (considering retyped computer records
considered contemporaneous time record), afl'd, 887 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1116 (1990).
202. Some courts have required very specific descriptions of the work done. Metro Data
Sys., Inc. v. Durango Sys., Inc., 597 F. Supp. 244, 245-46 (D. Ariz. 1984), offers a humorous
look at lawyer jargon in which the court criticized the use of the words "review" and
"analysis."
There are no less than 95 time entries in which a lawyer reviewed something. In most
instances "review" appears to be merely a synonym for "read," a less impressive
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Circuit ruling to mean "that courts should not be faced with an
impossible chore when making fee determinations, and that law-
yers should not be required to expend even more hours recon-
structing the past in assembling a fee application. ' 20 3 The court
should require time sheets to be submitted at monthly intervals
unless many attorneys work on the case or the case generates a
great deal of work.20 4 In these latter instances, weekly submissions
may be more appropriate. When used in conjunction with other
procedural devices, contemporaneous time records can be even
more effective. Lead counsel should review all records before sub-
mitting them to the court.205 Masters and magistrates should use
the records as a starting point in determining an appropriate fee
award.206 Used properly, contemporaneous time records eliminate
wasteful attorney time spent recreating hours after the litigation
has ended, thus reducing the possibility of more protracted
litigation.0 7
Most courts, following the instructions in the Manual for Com-
plex Litigation,208 have reduced fees in which contemporaneous
time records were required by the court but not maintained by
counsel.20 9 The importance of such records was recognized in'
term. After all, anyone can read, but it takes a lawyer to review.
An even more amorphous term is "analysis." There are no less than 15 time entries
for analysis. When the Court attempts to envision a lawyer engaged in five hours of
analysis, Rodin's "The Thinker" comes to mind.
Id. at 245-6.
203. Johnson, 742 F. Supp. at 837.
204. See MANUAL, supra note 25, § 24.21 (recommending submission of records every 60
days).
205. In re American Integrity Sec. Litig., 1989-90 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,738 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 8, 1989) (requiring counsel to submit time records for each calendar month to lead
counsel within 20 days after the close of each month, while requiring lead counsel to submit
the records to the court within 30 days).
206. See MANUAL, supra note 25, § 24.21 (allowing periodic review of time records by
magistrates or masters "to ascertain whether counsel are spending excessive time and
money in the litigation").
207. See id. ("Fee applications should not result in substantial additional litigation.").
208. "[F]ailure to keep contemporaneous time records justifies an appropriate reduction
in the award, if not denial of all fees." Id. "Except for good cause, the court should deny
compensation or reimbursement for items not reflected on these [contemporaneous] summa-
ries." Id.
209. See, e.g. Weinberger v. Great Northern Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 527 (1st Cir.
1991) (absence of contemporaneous time records justified denial of fee application); See e.g.,
Major v. Treen, 700 F. Supp. 1422 (E.D. La. 1988) (reducing fee award due to duplicative
work); Genden v. Merrill Lynch, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 208, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (awarding "re-
miss" attorney only $20,085 in fees for "over 206" hours of undocumented work); Tarver v.
City of Houston, 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) % 37,662 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (considering time
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[T]his court is well aware that a delay in recording time often leads
to its expansion. The attorney recalls that he worked all day on a
certain matter and did not leave the office until very late. He does
not recall the interruptions or the fifteen-minute diversions to han-
dle other matters. The failure to keep contemporaneous time
records must be recognized, and we do so by reducing the lodestar
hours of [the attorney] and his associates by 10 per cent.21'
Deciding which hours to disallow can be "problematic" since there
is no evidence that the time was not spent as the attorney sug-
gests.212 However, periodic review of records by a magistrate or
master should tip off the court to inadequate time records." 3 And
as long as counsel is on notice that the court will follow strictly its
pretrial order, as in the Exxon Valdez case, there is no unfairness
in disallowing time actually spent on the case.
When contemporaneous records are being used in conjunction
with a lead counsel, the lead counsel should consolidate the records
and submit them to the court according to each activity, project,2 14
or attorney. In other words, the court should be able to learn
quickly the total number of hours spent on a deposition or mo-
entries of "work on case" not specific enough to be compensated); Rothfarb v. Hambrecht,
649 F. Supp. 183, 200 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (rejecting vague descriptions of work done). But see
Carter v. Sedgwick County, 929 F.2d 1501, 1506 (10th Cir. 1991) (contemporaneous time
records not "a per se absolute requirement"); MacDissi v. Valmont Industries, Inc., 856 F.2d
1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 1988) (contemporaneous time records not "a per se absolute
requirement").
210. No. 76-C-3803, 1989 WL 36210 (N.D. IMI. Apr. 10, 1989).
211. Id.; see also In re Churchfield Management & Inv. Corp., 98 B.R. 838, 891 (Bankr.
N.D. IlM. 1989) ("There is simply no way accurately to measure the amount of time reasona-
bly, necessarily, and productively expended in the absence of a proffer of detailed contem-
poraneous time records") (citation omitted).
212. Hutchison v. Wells, 719 F. Supp. 1435 (S.D. Ind. 1989). The court in Hutchison
chided counsel ("lax record-keeping is hardly to be commended"), but only disallowed $208
for undocumented research. Id. at 1144-45; see also In re Churchfield Management & Inv.
Corp., 98 B.R. at 891 ("Without the time-and-hours data ... the bankruptcy judge had
little choice but to treat (the) petition with great conservatism.").
213. As the Third Circuit noted, "If a district court requires the submission of monthly
[attorney's fee] reports and has difficulty with the sufficiency of the content of those
monthly reports, it should express its difficulty immediately so counsel can correct any defi-
ciencies." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1192 (3d Cir. 1990).
214. In Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Ill. 1990), the court decreased
the attorneys' fee requested by class counsel since "[n]owhere is there one chronological
submission so that it can be readily determined which activities were being performed at the
same time by different attorneys." Id. at 296-97.
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tion.21 5 While this function can be performed by a master, as in
Rothfarb v. Hambrecht,21 e it is more appropriately the role of lead
counsel. One of the more egregious examples of abuse arose in the
Fine Paper litigation in which 4,500 hours were spent on preparing
one of the plaintiffs' pretrial memoranda, at a cost of $1 million to
the class. 21 7 Consequently, Judge Grady, who oversaw the Conti-
nental Illinois Securities case, required time records by activity:
Keeping time by activity or project seems a good way for a lawyer to
document the worth of his services, and it strikes me as the only
way for a group of lawyers to show the worth of their combined ser-
vices. The alternative - and regrettably, the tradition - is to leave
it to the judge to attempt an evaluation of a morass of unrelated
time entries which can and often do obscure the existence of dupli-
cation and excessive charges2"
This aspect of the Continental Illinois case was applauded
widely by lawyers in a Federal Judicial Center survey, with predic-
tions of significant cost savings.219 Other courts also have required
time records by activity. In Hutchison v. Wells, 220 the magistrate
who oversaw the fees process instructed the attorneys at a pretrial
conference that they would be required to break down their fees
"as to each count of the complaint. ' 221 When the attorneys con-
215. Compare Norman v. Housing Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988) ("A well
prepared fee petition also would include a summary, grouping the time entries by the nature
of the activity or stage of the case.") with Rode, 832 F.2d at 1189-90 (criticizing the specific-
ity required in Norman).
216. 649 F. Supp. 183 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
217. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 75 (D. Pa. 1983). Among the 51
plaintiffs lawyers and deputy attorneys general involved in the memo's preparation were 21
partners from 19 different law firms. What is especially astounding is that the memo was
not filed until after several states had filed a similar document covering many of the same
issues. Id. at 75.
218. In re Continental Ill. Secur. Litig., 572 F. Supp. 931, 935 (1983) (emphasis in
original).
219. Willging, supra note 51, at 30-32. "Typical reactions [by the attorneys] included
'best part of [the] order,' 'good management too,' 'very reasonable, even ingenious,' 'inter-
esting and innovative,' and 'great idea."' Id. at 30; see also MANUAL, supra note 25, § 24.13
("When several attorneys are seeking fees, either in the same or separate applications, they
may be required to provide the court with a compilation arranged by each particular task or
function, listing the hours and expenses (including travel) claimed by each particular law-
yer. This tabulation will enable the court to determine whether excessive or duplicative
hours are being claimed with respect to the same conference, deposition, brief or other
activity.")
220. 719 F. Supp. 1435 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
221. Id. at 1441 n.9.
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tested this requirement after the case was settled, the judge noted:
"This court appreciates the difficulty of separating billing hours
per count, but the fee applicant must bear the burden of docu-
menting hours to establish entitlement to an award." '222 The judge
upheld the magistrate's requirement.
In Johnson v. Kay,223 the plaintiffs' attorney submitted recon-
structed timesheets, instead of contemporaneous timesheets. Con-
sequently, the attorney proposed voluntarily to reduce his re-
quested fees by twenty percent "in an effort to avoid major
litigation over fees." '224 The judge accepted this proposal.
VII. INTERIM AWARDS AND AWARDS TO REFERRING LAWYERS
One of the major barriers to the consolidation of multidistrict
litigation is the uncertainty of how attorneys' fees will be awarded.
After consolidation, most of the attorneys who filed the original
suits play little or no role in the litigation and thus are unlikely to
be able to justify a fee petition to the court of consolidation. In
Agent Orange, for example, the only lawyers who were awarded
fees were those who worked on the consolidated case.22 5 Conse-
quently, many "referring" attorneys will resist consolidation and
failing that, will opt out of the case.
Support for compensating these referring attorneys comes from
a line of cases which suggests that attorneys' fees can be awarded
when a "substantial benefit" has been furnished, even when no
fund has been created.226 Certainly, the filing of suits can be seen
as a "substantial benefit" to the consolidated case; without these
222. Id. at 1441 (citing Hensley v. Eckhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)).
223. 742 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
224. Id. at 837
225. SCHUCK, supra note 27, at 196.
226. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 394 (1970) ("[T]he expenses incurred
by one shareholder in the vindication of a corporate right of action can be spread among all
shareholders through an award against the corporation, regardless of whether an actual
money recovery has been obtained in the corporation's favor"); see also Barbara Thompson,
Note, Attorneys' Fees in Class Action Shareholder Derivative Suits, 9 DUL. J. CoRP. LAw
671, 674 n.20 (1984). The legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1991) specifically allows the
awarding of interim fees:
[T]he phrase "prevailing party" should not be limited to a victor only after entry of a
final judgment following a full trial on the merits... A fee award may thus be ap-
propriate where the party has prevailed on an interim order which was central to the
case ...
H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4953,
4990.
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suits, no consolidation could occur. But to allow referring attorneys
to enforce their original one-third contingency fee agreements with
the plaintiffs would cheat the class members, forcing them to com-
pensate two sets of lawyers.
In the Beverly Hills Fire litigation,227 Judge Henry Wilhoit, Jr.,
devised an innovative solution. He allowed "referring" lawyers to
charge their clients up to 6.3% of the net final distribution, on top
of the ten percent awarded to the attorneys who worked on the
consolidated case.228 Wilhoit justified his decision, writing:
In a very real sense these attorneys have continued to provide valua-
ble services to their clients and to the [lead counsel committee].
These are the attorneys that have answered the many ". . . when
will I get my money?" telephone calls, the personal conferences at
their offices, homes, as well as inquiries on the street. This has been
most exasperating to many people because this complex litigation
has spanned nearly a decade. The ordinary citizen simply cannot
understand why it would take so long to wind these matters up. We
are confident that many times these attorneys felt that they had lost
credibility with their clients. They have been required to administer
files and they stood ready, willing and able to actively develop their
clients' damage claims had that eventually ever become necessary.2 29
While Judge Wilhoit's view of the plaintiff lawyer may be a bit
generous, his compromise seems to have a great deal of merit. In
the asbestos cases, some of the attorneys who settled the cases vol-
untarily paid local counsel who originally developed and prepared
the cases. 230
In the rare cases that actually go to trial on one common issue
(usually liability), many are returned to the original forums to de-
cide individual issues, such as damages. In these cases there is the
difficult issue of whether some interim attorneys' fees should be
awarded to those who litigated the common issue. While courts are
generally wary of awarding interim fees since the plaintiffs may
227. In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 639 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
228. Id. at 925. The 6.3 percent figure was derived from a desire to compensate referring
lawyers at 7 percent. But because 10 percent of the settlement already went for attorneys
fees, the 7 percent was reduced by 10 percent to leave 6.3 percent. The attorneys who
worked on the consolidated case were also allowed to charge their clients an additional 6.3
percent. Id. at 925 n.11.
229. Id. at 925.
230. Jensen, supra note 31, at 9.
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eventually lose,23' courts have been willing to grant such fees when
the suit is against the government.23 2 In People Who Care v. Rock-
ford Board of Education District No. 205,233 interim fees were
awarded in a school desegregation case, after a partial consent de-
cree resulted in systemwide integration. Nevertheless, "[in]any
questions remain for future determination. '"234 The district court
granted the plaintiff's request for $112,935.50 in fees, 2 5 and the
defendants appealed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal
since the resolution of the interim fee issue does not "materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. '236 In Doe v.
Calumet City,23 7 interim fees were awarded to attorneys represent-
ing a class of women arrested for misdemeanors and subjected to
unconstitutional strip searches. The district court had already re-
solved the issue of liability,238 and all that remained was the deter-
mination of damages. To ensure that the interim fees would not be
excessive, the court required one of the attorneys to be liable for
restitution if the final fee award were found to be lower.239
To maximize fairness to the attorneys, judges should attempt to
devise a reasonable distribution of fees to all attorneys who pro-
vide a "substantial benefit" to the class or help make the class a
"prevailing party." What constitutes a "substantial benefit" or a
''prevailing party" is a difficult matter and one which has not been
resolved conclusively by the courts.24 e
231. See Woolridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169 (6th Cir. 1990) (allowing no
fees for litigating unsuccessful damage actions).
232. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing interim
fees under Freedom of Information Act); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489 (11th
Cir.), modified on reh'g, 804 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (allowing interim fees
under Equal Access to Justice Act); Allen v. Department of Defense, 713 F. Supp 7 (D.D.C.
1989) (allowing interim awards under Freedom of Information Act); McKenzie v. Kennick-
ell, 669 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1987) (allowing interim awards under Title VII); Jurgens v.
EEOC, 660 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (allowing interim awards under Title VII). See
generally Gregory C. Sisk, Interim Attorneys' Fee Awards Against the Federal Govern-
ment, 68 N.C. L. REV. 117 (1989).
233. 921 F.2d 132 (7th Cir. 1991).
234. Id. at 133.
235. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., School Dist. No. 205, No. 89-C-20168,
1990 WL 25883 (N.D. IMl. Feb. 23, 1990).
236. People Who Care, 921 F.2d at 134 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(1991).
237. No. 87 C 3594, 1991 WL 22537 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 1991).
238. The district court's liability determination is contained in Doe v. Calumet City, 754
F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. IlM. 1990).
239. Doe, 1991 WL 22537, at *2.
240. The Supreme court most recently addressed this issue in Texas State Teachers Ass'n
v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, remanded, 874 F.2d 242 (5th Cir. 1989). The
Court defined a prevailing party as "one who has succeeded on any significant claim afford-
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VIII. CONCLUSION
According to Professor Kane, "No one suggestion or procedural
change can eliminate the complex management problems of or the
potential for conflicts in this modern form of litigation."24' Perhaps
the utility of this paper, then, is to show judges the different op-
tions available to them and how they have been employed by their
colleagues. Only in the most complicated cases, like the Agent Or-
ange litigation, will all of the above procedural devices be neces-
sary. But using any single device can dramatically improve the at-
torneys' fees process.
As noted already, the benefits of these procedural reforms may
be immeasurable in terms of restoring the credibility of legal sys-
tem. Frank McCarthy, one of the plaintiffs in the Agent Orange
case said, "You can't in all honesty say that the legal system
worked - it hasn't. It has destroyed my belief in the judicial sys-
tem forever, and the majority of the vets in this litigation feel this
way. '242 Whether judicial resistance to using these devices can be
eliminated is difficult to predict. After all, the American tradition
of judicial autonomy and decentralization allows judges "to run
their own show and thus to develop flexible, individualistic, and
personal styles of judging. 2 43 Though many judges continue to be-
lieve that the existing procedural requirements are adequate pro-
tection,244 the recent case law suggests that an increasing number
of judges are embracing the innovations described in this article.
ing it some of the relief sought, either pendente lite or at the conclusion of the litigation."
Id. at 791. The Court also noted that a prevailing plaintiff "must be able to point to a
resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the defend-
ant." Id. at 792. The practical application of these ambiguous guidelines by the lower courts
remains to be seen.
241. Kane, supra note 6, at 409.
242. Labaton, supra note 10, at D1.
243. Seron, supra note 6, at 567.
244. See Kane, supra note 6, at 399 & n.83.
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